Abortion, the willful termination of a pregnancy, is a very controversial issue in which almost every adult has a strong stance. Amongst many religious groups, churches, activist groups, and even “everyday voters,” abortion is a heavily politicized issue that often leads people to harass women, filibuster bills, ostracize people who disagree, or only vote for political candidates who are pro-life. Some people tend to obfuscate the facts, insist that their opinions are facts, appeal to emotion by holding signs with pictures of aborted fetuses, and condemn people who perform abortions in order to save lives. It is important to understand and take a clear and rational stance on the issue of abortion's morality because beliefs may often have disastrous consequences when they inform actions, politics, and worldviews.
Some philosophers argue that abortion is immoral in most circumstances. This includes Don Marquis who advances the “Future Like Ours” (FLO) position which is one of the most formidable arguments against the morality of abortion. Marquis argues that “one reason that it is morally wrong to kill an adult is because you are robbing that adult of their future experiences." From this premise, Marquis argues that abortions deprive fetuses of a future; according to Marquis, willful abortion, except in the case of protecting the life of the mother, is morally wrong.
Other philosophers argue that abortion is moral in most circumstances. This includes Judith Jarvis Thomson, who argues that abortion is morally permissible and says that the fetus's FLO does not supersede the rights of women to choose what they want to do with their own bodies. Thomson argues that a woman must give consent in order for others to have the right to use her body. Without such consent, no one or no thing may use a woman's body.
I will argue that abortion is moral in most circumstances, but is not moral in others, such as a situation in which a woman agrees to birth a child, grants consent for the unborn to use her body, and makes a promise with the father of the unborn stipulating that she will let the pregnancy take its course unless her life is threatened. To defend my conclusion, I will show that abortion is morally permissible in almost all situations because a woman must give consent in order for others to use her body; regardless of whether or not sex is protected or unprotected, abortion is morally permissible because women are not required to “pay the consequences” in a situation where there is no contract or obligation; and in the situation of rape, abortion is morally permissible because a woman is being forced into having sex, does not want to become pregnant with the child of the rapist, and does not give consent to either the unborn or the man who raped her.
Abortion is morally permissible in almost all situations because a woman must give consent in order for others to use her body. For the sake of argument, I can grant that life starts at conception (like Marquis and Thomson do) and still argue that abortion is morally justified. If someone or something wants to use the resources of a woman's body, a woman must not automatically consent to this; the woman has the option to not allow someone or something to use her body. If a woman does not give someone or something the consent to use the resources of her body, she may end the usage of these resources. The woman's right to choose what she wants to happen to her body trumps the FLO of the unborn if she wants this to be the case. Although this argument alone should be sufficient to defend abortion in almost all cases, I will bolster my previous argument with more arguments regarding specific situations where abortion is an option.
In addition to previous arguments, abortion is morally permissible for women who have protected or unprotected sex because they should not be forced to “pay the consequences” of bearing a child when they made no agreement to do so; sex is no contract in which a woman is morally obligated to have a child if she happens to become pregnant. In other cases of taking risks where there may be dire consequences, such as playing games of chance and skill like Blackjack, the person taking the risk agrees to “pay for the consequences” when he/she sits down at the table, but this clearly is not the case with sex.
In the case of protected sex, the argument is even easier to make because a woman is taking precautions to avoid becoming pregnant and clearly does not want to become pregnant. Although there is a slight risk of becoming pregnant, this does not entail that a woman would have to “pay for the consequences” when all precautions had been taken to avoid pregnancy.
In the case of rape, abortion is morally permissible because a woman is being forced into having sex, does not want to become pregnant with the child of the rapist, and does not give consent to either the unborn or the man who raped her. It is clear that we have no moral obligations to bear the burdens of situations that we do not consent to participate in. The case of rape is almost certainly the most obvious situation of all potential situations in which a woman is morally justified in having an abortion.
A plausible example of a situation in which abortion would not be morally permissible occurs when a woman agrees to have a child if she becomes pregnant, grants consent for the unborn to use her body, and makes a promise with the father of the unborn stipulating that she will let the pregnancy take its course unless her life is threatened. In a case like this, moral flip-flopping would not be permissible because a very clear agreement was made.