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Showing posts with label miracles. Show all posts
Showing posts with label miracles. Show all posts

Debate/Discussion with Pastor John Murray - NEPA Pridefest 2012




I recently had a debate/discussion with Christian fundamentalist Pastor John Murray from Tree of Life Christian Fellowship Church at NEPA Pridefest 2012 (an LGBT festival) in Kingston, PA. Murray and fellow churchgoers arrived to preach to/protest at NEPA Pridefest 2012.

We chatted for about 45 minutes about homosexuality, faith, theological fatalism, free will, the problem of evil, Stephen Law's 'Evil God Challenge,' the Bible, the resurrection of Jesus, miracles, cosmological arguments, the soul, sin, and much more.

Philosopher Stephen Law enjoyed the discussion and you might too.

Enjoy this lively discussion.


An a priori rejection of miracles?


I uploaded a short Youtube video (rather than writing a blog post) concerning miracles.

Here's the video description:
Do atheists/skeptics/secularists have an a priori rejection -- one before any sort of experience of investigation -- of miracle claims? If so, is this justified? Is this a bad thing? How do 'believers' of all stripes justifiably jump from "I don't know/I can't explain this" to "it's a miracle" ...and then ascribe the miracle to a specific source? I'm willing to accept miracle explanations if given good reasons, but what I have heard so far has been very insufficient.

Tebow 3:16 - God Doesn’t Help Tebow Win


This post is from a guest contributer who wishes to remain anonymous.


This Tebow thing is really getting out of hand. I thought it might have ended when his winning streak ended and the Broncos lost to the Patriots, but in this weekend’s wild card game, it happened again. Tebow threw about a 10 yard pass through dropped coverage that was run 70 yards for a touchdown in the first play of overtime. This meant, given NFL rules, the Steelers wouldn’t even get a possession to try to answer, so the Broncos advanced into the playoffs…to play the Patriots, again.

As you probably know, Tebow is the starting quarterback for the Denver Broncos. They have had a 'string of luck' lately—quite a few comeback, fourth quarter, and overtime wins. Of course, in the NFL, unlikely and quirky wins happen all the time. And when they do, people are usally critical. When teams win by barely beating teams with comebacks after quarters of terrible play, most people aren’t keen on singing your praises. Things, though, are different with Tebow. Why? Because he’s Christian. I mean really REALLY Christian. He was home schooled, so he has really had his religious beliefs beaten into him. He hosts an evangelically motivated website, 'wrote' similarly motivated books and has helped with his father’s missionary work in the Philippines... to help circumcise impoverished children. He also appeared in a pro-life commercial during the 2011 Super Bowl. When Tebow played for the Florida Gators, he wrote Bible verse references in his eye paint. Eye paint messages are not allowed in the NFL, but as a Bronco, Tebow has been regularly seen bowing down in petitionary prayer during games’ crucial moments and in prayers of gratitude right after touchdowns, often pointing up to heaven as he stands up, mouthing the words “thank you.” (This is now known as “Tebowing.”) As a result, many are inclined—without hyperbole—to attribute Bronco winning streaks to divine intervention.

The notion that the Bronco wins are a result of divine intervention has received a lot of attention. Saturday Night Live made fun of the notion the night before the Broncos lost to the Patriots in the regular season. Conan O’Brien reenacted the overtime pass against the Stealers with his peanut players having the hand of Jesus come down and guide the football into the receiver’s hand. ()

But to many—in fact to most—it’s not a joke; people who think that God is involved in Tebow’s wins are not joking and really think God is helping Tebow win. If you have any Christian football fans as Facebook friends, you know what I am talking about. If you watch a game, you will see many signs around the stadium that say “we believe.” Although they may simply have 'faith in their team,' the message seems to be more specific. They believe that Tebow has bestowed God’s favor onto the Broncos and that it will take them to the Super Bowl. Colorado pastor Wayne Hanson -- who has some connections to Tebow’s family -- just came right out and said it, “It’s not luck. Luck isn’t winning 6 games in a row. It’s favor. God’s favor.” Countless media outlets have echoed these thoughts.

The most recent game added to the hype. According to an ABC affiliate, Tebow passed for 316 yards, averaged 31.6 yards per completion, and the ratings for the game peaked at 31.6 at the very moment that Tebow threw the game winning touchdown. A Bible verse that Tebow often painted in his eye black when he was a Gator was (you guessed it) John 3:16. It is often considered the quintessential evangelical Bible verse. This has many seriously wondering whether God had a hand in the game’s stats. Since the NFL bans messages painted in eye black, could God be sending his own message? If so, it worked. “John 3:16,” according to the article, was the number one Google search on Monday, getting more hits than it ever has.

But does Tebow really think that God has a hand in his wins? Many Tebow fans want to deny this and say that he’s just thanking God for his talents while he is “Tebowing,” but it is quite difficult to maintain such a position given the evidence that Tebow gives us. When you always bow down in prayer during crucial moments of the games, and then when things go right you stand up, point to the sky, and say “thank you,” what else could you be doing but asking God for help and then thanking him once you get it? Why would you be thanking God for the chance to play or for your talents, in the most vital moments of the game? Is Tebow ecstatically jumping up and down after beating the Steelers, and then bowing down, thinking to himself “I’m so glad I’m talented. Thank Jesus?” In answer to a question about the Broncos' overtime win over Chicago, Tebow said, "I believe in a big God and special things can happen." Tebow may even believe that a Super Bowl win is preordained by God. "It's not necessarily prophesying, but sometimes you can feel God has a big plan,” he said. Tebow thinks God has a hand in his wins.

Bill O’Reilly, in an interview back in June, asked Tebow, “Do you pray for victory?” Tebow replied,

You know, I think He honestly does care about how we play on the field, more than anything more than win or lose our hearts on the field. On the field I'm trying to play for the glory of God but then also I'm trying to give everything I have and win and compete. And so I think more than just winning or losing, I think He cares about where our hearts are when we're playing.

Well, at least God has his priorities in order. According to Tebow, God cares more about 'Tebow’s heart' when he is playing than whether he wins. But he clearly still cares whether he wins. It’s really hard to deny that Tebow indeed does think God has a hand in his victories.

Even if Tebow doesn’t believe, his teammates do—teammates like Wesley Woodyard. He recounted to Mark Kiszla at the Denver Post Tebow’s message to him.

Tebow came to me and said, 'Don't worry about a thing,' because God has spoken to him." After Woodyard ripped the ball from Chicago's Marion Barber’s hand to prevent him from winning the game, Woodyard believes too. "I gave him a big hug,” said Woodyard, “and told him thank you. God speaks to people to reach other people.

If you want to think that Tebow doesn’t believe that God has a hand in his wins, fine. I’ve said enough about that, but it’s undeniable that a number of people do believe. They think that God is altering the outcome of his games—right down to the number of yards he passes for, to make people Google John 3:16. It’s this issue I want to examine. Is it rational to believe that God intervenes in Tim Tebow’s football games?

The simple answer is a resounding no. In fact, such a belief is about as irrational as you can get. Let’s talk about those “316” stats first.

They are interesting, but not remarkable. From what I can tell, they are accurate. He did throw for 316 yards. But he also completed 10/21 passes. Divide 316 by 10, and you get 31.6. So it’s not really two different independent occurrences of “316” because one derives from the other. But, although the overnight household ratings for the game were 25.9/46, the game did peak at 31.6/46 from 8:00-8:15 PM, ET. Although, Tebow was making his pass around that time, I highly doubt that the ratings spike happened at the moment that Tebow made the pass, as was reported above. It was probably after, when the 'Twitterverse' lit up with 9000 tweets a second, and more people tuned in as a result.

Thinking the “316” coincidences entail divine intervention is thinking at its most uncritical. What are the odds that Tebow would pass for exactly 316? Not that great. Chances the ratings would peak at 31.6 on the same night? Even lower. But, given the number of games that Tebow has played, will play, and the number of stats that are kept in NFL games, it is a guarantee that eventually one of his stats would equal some number that people would find significant. Maybe he could complete 4/16 passes in homage to Philippians 4:16, another bible verse that Tebow has painted in his eye black. (I hadn’t heard anyone claiming 3:16 is his favorite verse until now.) And it wouldn’t be too hard to find another instance of those numbers hiding in the slew of stats for any given game.

The fallacy involved in this kind of thinking involves anomaly hunting and a selection bias—we look for something remarkable, remember what we found, and forget all the unremarkable things we passed over. Sure, 316 yards is interesting…but how many stats, over all the games, have been completely insignificant? We don’t remember those. Just like when a psychic medium gets something right, and we remember it—and we forget the twenty other things that she just said that have nothing to do with anything. Keep looking and eventually you’ll find what you want.

But something else is very wrong with the “316 yards—it’s a sign!” mentality. Think about what it really entails. To get Tebow to throw exactly 316 yards, God would have had to control every minute detail of the game. Anyone going anywhere they are not supposed to, catching a throw they are not supposed to catch, or where they are not supposed to catch it, would ruin it all. The idea that God reaches down from heaven to make sure that Tebow’s pass gets to the receiver to win the game is already ridiculous enough—so ridiculous that when Conan portrays it literally on his show, we laugh out loud. But to think that God is directing every little aspect of a football game to make sure that Tebow gets 316 yards in exactly 10 throws [so when it’s divided by 10 the numbers don’t change] is just so stupid.

Not to mention—is God making everyone turn their TV on so that he gets exactly the 31.6 rating that he wants? Whatever happened to free will?

Many religious people will argue that, indeed, God does control every aspect of the game—and that he did make you turn on your TV. Why? Because God controls everything. So the idea that God has a hand in Tebow’s wins, and the 316 stats, is not crazy at all. Instead, it simply follows logically from the fact that God exists, they suggest.

But this is a highly controversial and widely criticized view of God and his nature. The idea that God predestines everything that occurs (including who goes to heaven, and who goes to hell) was argued for by John Calvin. But the idea runs afoul of many bible verses, not to mention many Christian ideas—like the fact that we are morally responsible for what we do. If everything I do, I do merely because God preordained—predetermined—that I would do it, then how is anything I do my fault? I can’t do anything but what God ordained I would do and the reason I do it ultimately has nothing to do with me or my decisions. If God makes me do it, then I’m not morally responsible. We usually wouldn’t think that you are morally responsible if you had to do something because someone had a gun pointed at your head. How much more so if God is literally controlling you like a puppet?

This idea also runs afoul of a common Christian apologetic move. The problem of evil asks how God could exist when there is so much evil in the world. A common reply is that the evil in the world is not the work of God—it is our work. We cause evil by our own free choices. Not all evil is the result of our free choices—no one has ever caused a tornado. So this solution doesn’t completely answer the problem. But it can’t solve anything if all our actions are predetermined by God. We can’t cause any evil if God makes us do what we do—if he does all our causing for us. Certainly, you can’t shift any blame off of God, onto us, for the evil in the world, if God predetermines all of it to happen.

Now, of course, football players’ performances are most often morally neutral—they aren’t out there causing good or evil. But here’s the thing. Christians maintain that when God doesn’t intervene in our free will decisions to prevent evil, like 9/11, it’s because free will is important. It must be protected and preserved. What, then, are we to make of the suggestion that God interferes with the free will of football players to make sure that a particular team wins? We must think it is absurd. If preventing 9/11 is not more important than preserving free will, certainly a football win is not either—no, not even a Tebow win. Not even if the win is a means by which God draws attention to himself or a bible verse.

To make things worse, the kind of reasoning that people are employing to conclude that God is helping Tebow is the worst kind. In a nutshell, it is an appeal to ignorance. An appeal to ignorance occurs when one interjects a supernatural explanation for something that they can’t explain. This happens when people conclude that Criss Angel is magic because they can’t explain how he does his tricks. [Criss Angel is actually very honest about the fact that he is an illusionist, and has no supernatural powers—just like all magicians don’t.] But what’s more likely: no natural explanation or that you simply can’t think of one?

But it’s worse than that because the events for which people are invoking supernatural explanations don’t even need supernatural explanations. They are not miraculous; they are not violations of the natural order. If one of Tebow’s passes had disappeared in mid-air and then just appeared in the arms of a receiver in the end zone—then you might have something. But fourth quarter comebacks and overtime wins happen all the time—not to mention 316 yard stats. (Just Google it and see how many other 316 yard passing games you can find.)

Concluding that Tebow threw 316 yards because God made him is like concluding that prime empty spot in a parking lot is a result of divine intervention. Sure, it’s possible that God could have caused whoever parked there to cut their shopping trip to Wal-Mart short so they would leave and vacate a spot just when you needed it. But what’s more likely—divine intervention or the simple fact that someone with a good spot left Wal-Mart of their own accord around the time that you arrived? It is more likely that God intervened in the game to make sure that Tebow threw exactly 316 yards or that, just like hundreds of quarterbacks before him, Tebow simply threw for 316 yards?

The fact that people are really taking this seriously, I’m afraid, only reveals the childishness of religious thinking. Non-religious people are not drawing this conclusion. And, to be fair, not all religious people are either. (Rev. Alan Rundick denies it, but also thinks that Tebow denies it too. But there is a particular brand of religious person who takes this seriously and I think this demonstrates the kind of childish thinking that is involved in this kind of religion. Children think magicians are magic, adults know they are illusionists. Children are fascinated by history channel specials on Nostradamus, adults know that it’s all retrodiction. Children can be fascinated by the fact that Tebow threw for 316 yards, but adults should not.

But I also think this reveals the kind of god that these people worship. For the god that they revere, given the kind of things they think he does, it makes perfect sense to them that God would make Tebow throw for 316 yards. It also probably makes sense to them that God would free up a spot in the parking lot for them. Nietzsche spoke of such a god in his work, “The Antichrist.”

what shall we do when [believers]… use the finger of God to convert their miser ably commonplace and huggermugger existence into a miracle of grace, a providence and an experience of salvation? The most modest exercise of the intellect, not to say of decency, should certainly be enough to convince these interpreters of the perfect childishness and unworthiness of such a misuse of the divine digital dexterity. However small our piety, if we ever encountered a god who always cured us of a cold in the head at just the right time, or got us into our carriage at the very instant heavy rain began to fall, he would seem so absurd a god that he’d have to be abolished even if he existed. God as a domestic ser vant, as a letter carrier, as an almanac-manat bottom, he is a mere name for the stupidest sort of chance....

If he were writing today, Nietzsche would have also mentioned football games.

A god who simply stands in for explanations of chance occurrences—especially chance occurrences that are bound to happen eventually anyway—is a childish invention, unworthy of worship. Christians who invoke God to explain Tebow’s success, who think that God even cares about football games, much less intervenes in them, do themselves and their entire religion a disservice. They trivialize God, trivialize religious belief, and they revitalize Tebow’s success.


P.S. Some have suggested that Tebow, and those like him,don’t pray to win—they just pray for everyone in the game to be safe and injury-free. There are three things to say about this: (1) He’s not doing that when he is bowing down on the sideline as the kicker lines up for the winning field goal. (2) God’s doing a pretty crappy job of keeping everyone safe, given the rise of concussions in football and the average survival rate of NFL players. (3) Praying for everyone in the game to be safe makes just about as much sense as praying for a win. Players are injured by the actions of others players. To keep everyone safe, God would have to make all the players be just where he wanted them to be—in other words, we would have to interfere with their free will. And, as we discussed above, he doesn’t do that. Unless you are asking God to not snap the cables of the overhead camera and make it fall on someone for shits and giggles, praying for safety at a football game doesn’t make much sense.

Local writer believes I am limited by dogma


In October, I wrote an Examiner.com article and a letter to the editor addressing some comments made by a local reverend who attributes prayer to the stopping of flooding in Northeastern Pennsylvania in September. In short, I argued that we should not accept a supernaturalistic explanation (of prayer stopping the flooding) when we can appeal to a naturalistic explanation (the water ebbed).

In a letter published on December 4 titled "Writer: Dogma limits rationalists," a writer, although he admits that "there appears to be obvious weight to the "natural explanation" I am "limiting [myself] in [my] hypothesis." The writer quotes G.K. Chesterson who notes that he believes miracles "upon human evidences as [he does] in the discovery of America."

A quote like this is quite silly. We have a tremendous amount of evidence to support the discovery of America that is quite recent, confirmed by second-hand sources, and is relatively uncontroversial. Explanations regarding the discovery of America, also, are not supernaturalistic.

The writer continues quoting Chesterton, "Somehow or another an extraordinary idea has arisen that the believers in miracles accept them (rightly or wrongly) because they have evidence for them. The disbelievers in miracles deny them (rightly or wrongly) because they have a doctrine against them."

To assume that disbelievers in miracles deny miracles because they have a doctrine against them is ridiculous. I deny miracle explanations, in short, not because "I have a doctrine against them," but rather because naturalism (belief that all exists is the natural world) is very inductively justified; supernatural explanations throughout history have fallen to the wayside in favor of naturalistic explanations (read more about this in my opening statement here). Additionally, saying "a miracle happened" is a poor explanatory device because miracle claims generally appeal to that which is unexplained and raise far more questions than they answer.

The writer continues, "The open, obvious, democratic thing is to believe an old apple-woman when she bears testimony to a miracle, just as you believe an old apple-woman when she bears testimony to a murder."

This is a very poor way to reason. If an old apple-woman claims that she saw a miracle, I'm not going to believe her until I find sufficient evidence to establish warrant for believing the miracle claim. I'll investigate, sure, but I won't 'just believe.' Human testimony, Hume famously argued, is insufficient to establish a miracle unless the falsehood is more miraculous than the miracle:

The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention), 'That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish....' When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.

The writer continues, "If it comes to human testimony there is a choking cataract of human testimony in favor of the supernatural. If you reject it, you can only mean one of two things ... you either deny the main principle of democracy, or you affirm the main principle of materialism - the abstract impossibility of a miracle."

This is a quite obvious false dichotomy; there are more options here besides "denying the main principle of democracy" or "affirming the main principle of materialism." I can, of course, not even appeal to materialism (and/or not even accept materialism is true) and say that there is not enough reason, argument, and evidence to establish that a miracle occurred. Casting persons who don't believe miracles as 'undemocratic' is not useful here.

**

Mere human testimony is simply inadequate to establish a miracle. If we were accept [just] testimony and agree that testimony were sufficient [enough] to establish a miracle, we'd be forced to believing all sorts of miracle claims and arrive at contradictions. Some Catholics, for instance, will say that the Virgin Mary performs miracles and some Wiccans, for example, will not believe the Virgin Mary performs miracles and may appeal to goddesses and gods. If we were to accept testimony from both, we would believe that the Virgin Mary performs miracles and that gods and goddesses perform miracles when both propositions are not compatible.

While not quite a miracle, we'd also have to accept the testimony of persons who were abducted by aliens, 'cured' by faith healers, divined by psychics, and so much more. Obviously we don't accept these testimonies, so why dismiss these things while accepting testimony of miracles?

Some persons, responding to skeptics, might allege the following, "Well, do you think this person is lying? So many people are so honest and are convinced that they experienced miracles! What good reason have they to lie?" It would not be proper to call believers in miracles 'liars,' but rather is proper to say -- and with good reason -- that these people have been deceived; believers in miracles may be very truthful and sincere, but it can be the case that they haven't considered better explanations for the events they allegedly witnessed.

Instead of accepting miracle explanations, we should look for naturalistic explanations that better explain phenomena. Testimony is not sufficient to establish a miracle claim. The skeptic is not being 'dogmatic' in rejecting miracles, but rather is open-minded and rejects miracle claims for good reasons.

Divine Hiddenness and Free Will


Atheists (and theists) wonder why -- since it is the case that theists profess God wants everyone to believe he exists – God simply doesn't unequivocally reveal himself so that persons can 'enter into a relationship' with God, no longer doubt, stop fighting one another because of religious differences, and go to Heaven. An all-powerful, all-loving, and all-knowing god should have no problem revealing himself to persons and should want to do so considering he is all-loving [he wants persons to avoid Hell and enter into Heaven]. Why, then, doesn't God just stop playing hide-and-seek and reveal himself?

'Free will defenses' are typically given to explain divine hiddenness. Some variations of free will defenses to explain divine hiddenness and other ideas worth considering are as follows:

  • (1) Humans would not have free will if God unequivocally revealed himself.
  • (2) If God provided too much evidence to attest to his existence, persons would not be able to enter into a union with God properly because persons would be compelled to believe.

  • (3) Faith is important and is only possible if God doesn't unequivocally reveal himself.

  • (4) If people unequivocally knew that God existed, they wouldn't make morally significant decisions; people must choose good over evil rather than being compelled to do so.

  • (5) God can't intervene often because there would be no stable natural regularities. (Swinburne argue this although this is probably more relevant to natural and moral evil theodicies).

  • (6) We can't know the mind of God. God has some reason to remain hidden, but we are simply not aware of it.

  • (7) Why expect God to reveal himself? It is the responsibility of humans to find God, not God's responsibility to reveal himself to humans.

I will respond to these six defenses and note further problems that theists face in which they simply can't 'have it both ways.'

Defense (1): Humans would not have free will if God unequivocally revealed himself.

Defense (1) is probably the most common defense that is given to explain divine hiddenness. Theists maintain that free will is supremely important and that this must be maintained no matter what. This 'free will defense' is also commonly given to explain moral evil even when, for example, someone's free will is being 'violated' by the actions of others. For instance, if someone is being raped, God won't intervene, the theist says, because the free will of the rapist is important to maintain. All of this aside, let's consider this defense more thoroughly.

Is it really the case that persons would lose free will if God unequivocally revealed himself? I'm quite skeptical. Many persons today will profess that God does exist and really do believe. Some, for whatever reason, will attest that their belief in God is warranted, profess belief in Heaven and Hell, and believe that their sins could result in eternal torment. Despite all of this, theists who profess very strong beliefs continue to sin. While God hasn't unequivocally revealed himself to everyone, these people will believe that God has revealed himself through the 'design' of the universe, an answered prayer, or something else...and they still sin. Additionally, these people, theists will allege, still have free will. It seems that defense (1), then, fails.

Would people suddenly be physically or logically unable to perform certain actions if God revealed himself? What good reasons do we have for believing this? Theists may argue that some behavior [or all behavior] may change, but I am quite skeptical of this. I'm additionally quite skeptical of the idea that such behavioral changes would not be the result of free choice. (Let's assume, for sake of this argument, that theistic definitions of free will are tenable.)

Perhaps the theist, at this point, will argue “Even though these people profess belief, it's not a belief that is the result of an unequivocal revelation of God. If God unequivocally revealed himself, the world would be a much different place and persons would not freely believe in God.” While it would very likely be the case that many non-believers (and/or persons who are theists, but don't really seem to care about adhering to 'God's law') would believe that God existed if he unequivocally revealed himself, I doubt that the believers who are currently really, really, really confident that God exists would act much differently. 'Free' or 'not free,' it seems that the behavior of those who are really, really, really confident that God exists would remain the same. Are we to believe that these people are simply 'faking it' and don't really believe as they profess (or something else)?

I and many other atheists are aware that even if a, say, 400 foot Jesus were to march through the skies and mountains were to spin around in the sky, there would still be reasons to be skeptical. Perhaps some advanced alien technology that we are unaware of is causing us to imagine that the event is happening or the display itself is the result of such technology. If I were to see something that did not seem to adhere with what I currently know about the universe, I wouldn't immediately jump to the conclusion that God exists. I'd approach this matter very carefully and would not jump to conclusions. If I were to believe in God after the result of a careful process and investigation, would the theist [who believes in free will] honestly say that my belief was not a result of free choices?

Defense (2): If God provided too much evidence to attest to his existence, persons would not be able to enter into a union with God properly because persons would be compelled to believe.

Defense (2) is quite suspect primarily because believers believe there is currently enough evidence to believe in God (thus they believe). What, exactly, is 'too much evidence,' anyway... and how is that different than enough evidence? Believers will point to the currently available evidence as 'overwhelming' by noting that the universe seems designed by God (look at the trees, stupid!), the resurrection of Jesus happened and there is historical information to attest to this, God answers prayers, the universe is fine-tuned, other miracles occurred, etc. Are we to believe that this current 'evidence' compels people to believe when many people simply are not convinced by it?

This idea of entering into a proper union with God, in this light, is interesting. Apparently, since an overwhelming amount of evidence currently exists, according to theists, no one is able to properly enter into union with God.

Perhaps to be more charitable, let us assume that some theists admit that the current evidence for God is not overwhelming (or not even convincing enough to believe) and belief is had only by faith. This would be quite an awkward admission because the belief, then, would only be justified (somehow) because of faith. On the theist's own admission, there is no evidence sufficient to warrant belief. If this is the case, what sort of evidence that God can produce possibly warrant belief? Why would 'the game' suddenly change if God were to produce the evidence?

Perhaps the theist, answering this, might say, “I have granted that there is no current evidence to warrant belief in God, but there could be some evidence to warrant belief in God that God could produce. God revealing himself would be that evidence.” I still, though, don't think that such evidence would compel people to believe or somehow take away their ability to disbelieve.

Defense (3): Faith is important and is only possible if God doesn't unequivocally reveal himself.

Defense (3) assumes that faith is important and seems to assume that without faith, belief in God is worthless. Why is this the case? Is not belief the important thing regardless of faith? Are those who currently believe and do not profess faith (but rather profess that arguments alone are good enough reason to believe) somehow 'doing it wrong?' Will these people not enter into a proper union with God?

Defense (4): If people unequivocally knew that God existed, they wouldn't make morally significant decisions; people must choose good over evil rather than being compelled to do so.

Defense (4) fails for some reasons noted above and namely because persons currently profess that the evidence of God is overwhelming...and these people still are able to make 'morally significant decisions.' Are we to believe that those who currently believe in God based on what they consider to be overwhelming evidence are being compelled to make certain decisions? A common idea that theists propose is that people would refrain from sinning if there were overwhelming evidence for God, but this obviously is not the case because people who believe there is overwhelming evidence continue to sin. Additionally, such persons who unequivocally believe note that 'nothing will change their mind' and that God's existence is quite obvious; such persons believe God has already unequivocally revealed himself. Again, as I mentioned, I find great difficulty believing that the behavior of persons would not be the result of free choice [assuming free will exists] if God unequivocally revealed himself.

Defense (5): God can't intervene often because there would be no stable natural regularities. (Swinburne argue this although this is probably more relevant to natural and moral evil theodicies).

Defense (5) is very suspect and ignores the fact that God is all-powerful and all-knowing. Why should we assume that there would be no natural regularities if God intervened in human affairs? Suppose that God were to strike down Hitler in order to prevent World War II (and such an action would indeed stop World War II). Would we then believe that this would suddenly entail that there would be no natural regularities? I don't see any good reasons to believe so.

The idea of God's intervention removing natural regularities (or, perhaps, to be more charitable, causing us to believe that some natural regularities might not be constant) seems quite funny [and leading to special pleading] considering that theists believe God has intervened in human affairs including but not limited to God raising Jesus from the dead. Some theists also believe that God answers prayers that would interfere with the free will of other persons. If theists maintain that Jesus raising from the dead and God's answering of prayer doesn't take away free will or natural regularities, how can they possibly maintain that God's intervention in there here and now, the future, or even in the past (minus the miracles, of course) would take away free will or natural regularities? The theist, it seems, would be forced to argue -- if he/she were to maintain that God's intervention would not take away free will or natural regularities – that free will 'works differently' from time to time, God's intervention in times past somehow did not take away free will, the free will of people in times past was not cherished like it is for people today, or something else.

Defense (6): We can't know the mind of God. God has some reason to remain hidden, but we are simply not aware of it.

Defense (6) can always pop up in almost any discussion about God. This 'mystery card' claims that there is some unknown, undetectable reason that God might have for failing to reveal himself in this case. We can, though, think of many really good reasons God would have for revealing himself and see, when other defenses are presented, that such defenses do not give us reason to believe God has a good reason to remain hidden (and argue that lack of evidence, reason, and argument supporting God's existence gives us good reason to not believe). Why should this 'unknown, undetectable reason' be permitted for the Christian god and not others? For all we know, every possible god for whom we currently have no good reason to believe exists has their own reasons to remain hidden. Who are you to question the minds of every possible god? I go into more detail with the 'You can't know the mind of God' defense here.

Defense (7): Why expect God to reveal himself? It is the responsibility of humans to find God, not God's responsibility to reveal himself to humans.

This objection largely misses the point of the problem of divine hiddenness to being with: if God is all-loving, all-knowing, and all-powerful, why shouldn't he reveal himself to humans? If the theist contests that it is the responsibility of humans to find God, this doesn't address the problem, but only shifts the responsibility. Further, if humans are to find God, doesn't this mean that God should have devised a more effective way of aiding humans to this goal? The 'ball' is back in 'God's court.'

Framing this in terms of responsibility might also be unhelpful. The problem really isn't about responsibility, but rather is that God -- since he is all-loving and all-powerful -- has no good reason to remain hidden and has every reason to make himself known.

---

When we don't find a good reason to believe a proposition, the proper response is to not accept the claim. If we can't think of a possible reason for God not revealing himself (and additionally find no reasons to believe God exists), we're quite justified in not believing that the Christian god exists. Even if we can devise a reason for God remaining hidden, this doesn't, of course, mean that God exists. With lack of a reason for God to remain hidden and a lack of a reason to believe God exists, the theist faces two major problems.

The common defenses theists give to answer the problem of divine hiddenness fail. Theists believe that persons would lose their free will if God unequivocally revealed himself, but this simply is not the case. The variations of this free will response to the problem of divine hiddenness are not sufficient for one to believe that God has a good reason to remain hidden. Additionally, the idea that natural regularities can only be had if God remained hidden fails. Finally, the common 'mystery card,' if this works for the Christian god, would have to work for every other possible god.

My second post in this 'series' is here.

Curtis/Vacula Debate Series "Does the Christian God Exist?" - Compilation Post

My written debate with JD Curtis on the topic of "Does the Christian God Exist?" has concluded.
All of our statements have been posted on our respective blogs.

All of the linking and foraging though my blog and JD Curtis's blog might be somewhat annoying (even though I've included links in previous posts, so I'll place everything in this post into various word documents so it looks nice and is easy to access.

Opening Statement by JD Curtis:



First Rebuttal by JD Curtis:

Second Rebuttal by Justin Vacula:

Second Rebuttal by JD Curtis:

Closing statement by JD Curtis:

Jesus Resurrection Claims - Minimal Facts Approach


This post is a bit disorganized, but hopefully you can follow along. I should update this at some point.

I've recently been watching debates, reading what historians have to say, and considering historical arguments for Jesus' resurrection. Christian apologists claim that historians have agreed on a list of various facts surrounding Jesus' death, ministry, and influence that the best explanation for all of these facts is that God raised Jesus from the dead. The people presenting this sort of argument are using a form of inductive argumentation known as abduction - argument leading to the best explanation. I find this line of thinking about Jesus to be critically flawed in many areas. I need not deal with these minimal facts if I can show that the methodology is seriously flawed, but I will anyway and offer naturalistic explanations to account for these minimal facts.

Here is a sample of the "minimal facts" from Gary Habermas:

1. Jesus died by crucifixion.

2. He was buried.

3. His death caused the disciples to despair and lose hope.

4. The tomb was empty (the most contested).

5. The disciples had experiences which they believed were literal appearances of the risen Jesus (the most important proof).

6. The disciples were transformed from doubters to bold proclaimers.

7. The resurrection was the central message.

8. They preached the message of Jesus’ resurrection in Jerusalem.

9. The Church was born and grew.

10. Orthodox Jews who believed in Christ made Sunday their primary day of worship.

11. James was converted to the faith when he saw the resurrected Jesus (James was a family skeptic).

12. Paul was converted to the faith (Paul was an outsider skeptic).


Flawed Methodology:

Objection One)
Can a miracle from a specific source ever be the best explanation?

A miracle, by definition, is a very improbable occurrence and an event that happens despite natural laws. We know, for example, that humans can not traverse oceans with water-walking abilities. We can get a large group of people and ask them to walk on water and all will almost certainly fail. We can look at what we know about human anatomy, the density of water, and other justified background assumptions to come to the conclusion that the probability of a human walking on water is very, very, very low. If we presented some information surrounding a specific person who went to the ocean, was not found, and had followers claim he/she walked on water (this is essentially what the minimal facts advocates are doing, but I'll go more in detail later), a miracle would not be the best explanation because water-walking is tremendously unlikely. We might offer some other naturalistic explanations/alternative hypotheses to better explain the information we have. A naturalistic explanation is always more probable that a supernaturalistic one. Even if the naturalistic explanation is very unlikely, it's still more likely than the occurrence of a miracle.

The appeal to "the best explanation is a miracle" may commit an informal logical fallacy known as an argument from ignorance. The inability to come up with a plausible naturalistic explanation does not warrant a supernatural conclusion. Why shouldn't we just say "I don't know" instead of jumping to supernatural conclusions?

Can a miracle be assigned to a specific source? How we we possibly arrive at the conclusion of "God raised Jesus from the dead" rather than "Advanced alien technology raised Jesus from the dead?" Can we say that God is more likely to raise Jesus from the dead than advanced alien technology (or some other source)? Even if the miracle happened, how can we say what caused the miracle?

Objection Two)
People are trying to use a historical method to come to theological conclusions. They can't possibly do this and they can't have it both ways.

Historians can't tell you what certainly happened in the past because we are unable to replicate events concerning people that have happened. (And forget the notion of absolute certainty. Don't even go there.) Historians can determine what probably happened in the past. In order to do this, historians want to collect a great deal of evidence from many sources who are disinterested and contemporaries at the time of these events. Historians want to take data from reliable sources and must sift the myths and exaggerations. We can take information from the Iliad, for example, to learn about geography and some other facts, but must discount the supernatural claims and the myths associated with the story.

Those who use the minimal facts approach are using the conclusions of historians to reach a theological claim, but this is unwarranted for several reasons. Theology simply is not history. The claim "God rose Jesus from the dead" is not a historical claim, but rather a theological claim that historians can't make. Historians deal with the natural world and the probable, not some sort of supernatural realm and the improbable (miracles). Historians can't reach the conclusion, while doing history, that God raised Jesus from the dead.



Dealing with the minimal facts:

Minimal Facts One and Two: Jesus died by crucifixion and He was buried.

These facts have nothing to do with whether or not Jesus was raised from the dead. There are many other facts about Jesus such as "Jesus was a male, Jesus was put on trial by Pilate, etc," but none of these have anything to do with whether or not Jesus came back from the dead. No matter how Jesus died (he could have been hanged, drowned, suffocated, etc), he still could have been raised from the dead. The method of death and the subsequent burial has nothing to do with this. The burial might as well be put with the empty tomb (which is admittedly the most contested of the facts).

Minimal Fact Three: His death caused the disciples to despair and lose hope.

This makes sense and is very plausible. Jesus' disciples were part of his travelling ministry and were very close to Jesus. The disciples were, as most people would be, stricken with grief when someone whom they really loved died. If the disciples believed that Jesus would be raised from the dead/he was God, they be quite distraught when they learned that their messiah was to be killed. This fact, though, has nothing to do with whether or not Jesus was raised from the dead.

Minimal Fact Four: The tomb was empty.

Minimal facts advocates claim that since Jesus' tomb was empty, he must have been raised from the dead, but this is jumping to a conclusion with supernatural content. This fact is the most contested by historians and if false, the entire enterprise seems to unravel. Here is a naturalistic explanation that while improbable is still more probable than "a miracle happened."

- Followers of Jesus raided the tomb and took the body so that people believed he was raised from the dead. While doing this in the dead of night while guards were not around (do guards patrol tombs, anyway?), the followers were eventually found and killed. All of the bodies were then put into a common grave and the body of Jesus was never found/identified.

Might this have happened? Probably not...but this is still more probable than "a miracle happened."

Minimal Fact Five: The disciples had experiences in which they believed were literal experiences of a risen Jesus.

It is important to note that this is what the disciples believed had happened. It's very plausible to come to a conclusion that this is what the disciples thought had happened. People who love others dearly can believe that they are speaking with those who are deceased and actually do (although they don't get any responses). The site I linked above notes that "there is no such thing as a grief hallucination in the DSM-4," but this doesn't matter because a grief hallucination (or any hallucination, really) need not be indicative of a mental disorder. People have hallucinations when they use drugs, are waking from sleep, etc. Hallucination need not be a negative term.

Imagine, for a moment that a wife and husband had been married for sixty years and the wife recently lost her husband and was not able to tell him a secret she had held throughout their entire relationship. The wife might really believe that she sees her husband and may "have a conservation" with him talking about the secret. This account is very plausible and can be linked to the disciples' visions. Imagine that the disciples were in a crowd of people and starting talking "to the air" and others thought that they were actually speaking to Jesus. News spreads, stories evolve, and eventually you get "the disciples literally spoke to a risen Jesus." Changing of stories within religious traditions is quite common. Buddhism, for example, has evolved over centuries and has many elements that were not included in the "original version." The Buddha stayed silent regarding various metaphysical questions such as the afterlife, but later traditions believe that by following the Buddha's advice, there actually are answers (while some believe that there are no answers). Regardless, stories change and traditions evolve.

One tradition in Syriac Christianity alleges that Jesus had a twin brother. Imagine that after the crucifixion Jesus' twin brother (if he indeed had one) appeared to many and he was mistaken for Jesus. In some of the Gospel narratives, people didn't really even know who Jesus was and mistaked him for John the Baptist. Perhaps someone else looked like Jesus and Jesus didn't have a twin brother, but people thought that they saw Jesus after he was crucified. This is a plausible explanation of how people"saw Jesus."

Some minimal facts advocates may object and say that groups of people saw Jesus, so they can't all be wrong, but this is a fallacious appeal to the masses. Just because many people believe something doesn't mean it is true. The Book of Mormon, for example, starts with a signed witness testimony of people who believe that the events in the book are true. Millions of followers of recently deceased Sathya Sai Baba believe in his miracles. Can they all be wrong? Of course they can. The idea of evolving stories and embellishments can easily account for a plausible explanation of the disciples' visions.

Minimal Fact Six: The disciples were transformed from doubters to bold proclaimers.

Doubters frequently become bold proclaimers. So what?

Minimal Facts Seven + Eight : The resurrection was the central message + They preached the resurrection message in Jerusalem.

This is an interesting claim, but it also leads us to a "so what" conclusion. Followers of Jesus, after they realized their messiah died, could have tried to make sense of what happened by looking to old scriptures and even what Jesus said. Even if Jesus said that he was going to come back from the dead, this doesn't mean that because people believed he came back from the dead we're warranted in believing that he actually did. The resurrection might "make sense" of this fact coupled with others, but it's certainly not the simplest explanation because it requires a supernatural explanation and another supernatural entity. "Jesus was raised from the dead by God" raises more questions that the conclusion answers. Preaching a message also doesn't entail that it is true.

Minimal Fact Nine: The Church was born and grew.

The fact that the Church was born and grew can be explained without its central ideas being true. Look at groups today like Scientology, Seventh Day Adventists, and Mormons...

Minimal Fact Ten: Orthodox Jews who believed in Christ made Sunday their primary day of worship.

So what? This doesn't entail that the resurrection happened.

Minimal Fact Eleven: James was converted to the faith when he saw the resurrected Jesus (James was a family skeptic).

This is essentially the same as fact 6 and can be dealt with using the same explanation that I offered.

Minimal Fact Twelve: Paul was converted to the faith (Paul was an outsider skeptic).

Paul did not literally see Jesus, but rather had a vision on the road to Damascus. The New Testament also talks of other "appearances" like these regarding Elijah and Moses. Are we really going to believe that the literal bodies of Moses and Elijah also appeared to people and equivocate appeared?

Afterthoughts...

The minimal facts approach is inadequate to arrive at a conclusion of "God raised Jesus from the dead." Minimal facts proponents want to use historical information to reach a theological claim, but this is not operating within a historical framework/approach. Historians can't say that God raised Jesus from the dead because this is not a historical claim, but rather a theological claim. A miracle, as I previously noted can't be the best explanation for events because it is, by definition, the least probable occurrence.

Even if Jesus did raise from the dead, how can we even possibly establish that the Christian god raised Jesus from the dead? Is this conclusion more likely than "advanced technology made a clone of Jesus or fooled people" or "advanced technology left a body double of Jesus on the cross and teleported him back after wiping his memory of the teleportation?" My explanations of alternative supernatural claims may seem really funny, but I want to demonstrate a point. Even if a miracle happened, we can't establish its source. Adding God to the picture, just like adding advanced technology, is making the explanation even more unlikely because, as I previously mentioned, more questions are raised than are answered.

Even if all of my naturalistic explanations are very unlikely, they are still more likely than "God raised Jesus from the dead." If we see some facts relating to a series of events and can't come to a conclusion, we should say "I don't know" instead of positing supernatural entities and explanations that raise more questions than they answer.

There are also various problems with the historicity of the Gospels, problems with eyewitness testimony, contradictions in the New Testament, etc, but I won't go into this in this post.


The "God raised Jesus from the dead [GRJD]" hypothesis is not simple. It requires an extra entity, God, along with various supernatural elements such as a supernatural realm (Jesus went to Heaven).

The GRJD hypothesis is not conservative. It goes against what we already know about death. People who are dead for three days simply don't come back. Bodies that have begun decomposition don't animate and come to life.

The GRJD hypothesis isn't fruitful. It doesn't make predictions that can be verified.

The GRJD hypothesis doesn't have good explanatory power because it raises more questions than it answers. Why was Jesus the only person raised from the dead? How do we know God exists (Saying that we know that God exists because Jesus was raised from the dead by God would be begging the question)? How did a dead body come back to life? How does the supernatural/non-physical effect the physical? Why wouldn't this event happen at some other time so that we would have good reason to believe it/why did this happen in such a remote place before advanced technology existed? How do we know God, rather than someone or something else, raised Jesus from the dead? Although the GRJD hypothesis would explain the minimal facts, we have many more questions to consider (and we need good reason to accept this claim rather than "It would explain all of the facts." Aliens made a body double of Jesus and teleported him to the people after one of the bodies died would also explain the facts, but would also raise more questions than it answers.

Naturalistic explanations that I have offered are more likely explanations that are more simple, conservative, fruitful, and has more explanatory power. Even if I don't have a good explanation for the minimal facts, we're still not epistemically justified in saying a miracle happened and bridging the gap from "I don't know" to "God did it." Miracle proponents can't possibly distinguish between possible sources of miracles and thus can't assign a specific entity, such as God, to a miracle; even if a resurrection happened, how can we know that God did it? As Arthur C. Clarke said, "Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic."


Encountering some real objections that directly address my post:

Objection 1:
All of nature's operations does not count against a miracle because a miracle does not undermine natural laws. Hume was wrong on two counts here because God's action in history, which would be extraordinary and not assumed to be impossible given that nothing is being undermined, acts upon established laws, and probability theory shows that an extraordinary event does not require extraordinary evidence. For instance, You can have five decks of cards and I can predict exactly which three you will pull next. All that is required here for evidence is to show the cards, which is not so extraordinary. Therefore argument to the best explanation can indeed include a supernatural explanation without being classified as ignorant.

A further problem here is just how much evidence would one need to not call a miracle an ignorant explanation. If it is never acceptable as an explanation then it would seem that one can never use a supernatural explanation even if there's a robust supernatural context one can posit and approach it with. According to you, such a context could NEVER be established.

I never claimed that miracles violated the laws of nature, but rather claimed that the probability of someone walking on water, for example, is very unlikely given our background assumptions. In the case of being raised from the dead after being dead for three days, we have never verified this phenomenon/seen this happening. Even if Jesus was raised from the dead by God, the percentage of people who have been raised from the dead is close to zero. Whether or not a miracle violates the laws of nature is a red herring.

This commenter uses a false analogy when he mentions predicting the next three cards from a deck of five decks of cards. The chances of predicting the cards, assuming that you are not cheating, is quite low, but not as low as someone being raised from the dead. Unlike the GRJD hypothesis, predictions of cards are not supernatural events and do not go against what we know about the world. The commenter says "all we would need to do is show the cards" to confirm the prediction, but this is much different than what the minimal facts advocates are doing. Showing the cards would confirm that the prediction is correct. No abduction is used here. We aren't even using minimal facts! In the card prediction example, the entire process is naturalistic and no supernaturalistic explanation is given, much unlike the GRJD hypothesis.

If the precautions were not taken, the best explanation would be "This person was more likely to be cheating rather than really guessing.

More, but not necessary....
The commenter says that the confirmation of this prediction/event would not require extraordinary evidence because one would just need to show the cards, but he's missing more information here that would need to be shown to establish that this happened (and this certainly can happen by chance if people tried long enough and the reshuffling of the cards was instant or very fast - it would be inevitable). I'm not quite clear if the commenter is proposing a one-shot guess or a guess over many tries, but if someone were to establish that it were a one shot guess done by one person at one time without cheating, there would need to be extraordinary evidence and precautions that would give us good reason to believe that this actually happened. Here's an example: various expert dealers would inspect the cards to make sure that they aren't marked, shuffle all of the cards outside of the guesser's vision, deal the three cards outside of the guesser's vision, and record the results by sealing them in an envelope and giving them to an uninterested party. The guesser would then type his prediction on a computer system that was brought in by a disinterested party that was verified by computer experts (so that there is no cheating involved) that was saved before the cards were revealed. All of this could be shown on live TV, viewed by a panel of skeptics and experts so that they ensure that there was no cheating, etc. Regardless of all these precautions, if enough people made predictions, a correct prediction would be inevitable.

The commenter says that, according to me, a miracle could never be a justified explanation. The commenter asks just how much evidence would we need to not call a miracle a result of an argument from ignorance. The evidence presented for the GRJD hypothesis is supplemented by very little evidence that is not good evidence (as I mentioned above) to warrant a conclusion that a miracle happened. "How much evidence would we need to establish that a miracle happened" is an interesting question. Even if miracles happened, as I mentioned, we still would not be able to establish exactly what caused this miracle. Was it God? Was it Satan? Was it advanced alien technology? The minimal facts advocates not only claim that Jesus raised from the dead, but rather that GOD raised Jesus from the dead. Can we honestly say that "God raised Jesus from the dead" is more or less likely than "Satan raised Jesus from the dead?" I mentioned this after objection one, but will now go back and add this to objections.

Objection 2:
Historians do the work of saying which historical facts are most likely. The more diverse the historians and the more of them that agree make the proposition in question more likely. The conclusion to explain historical data however is not the work of historians, but the work of philosophers. I've seen Bart Ehrman make the same claim as you do, but he is an historian trying to do philosophy, which ends up being quite flawed given his ignorance of modern probability theory. He is to be respected as far as his contribution to the data, but his inference must draw on the best philosophy, which is a leap beyond historical instruments.

It's possible to raise an objection like this to anything by saying something like, "Computer scientists aren't doing computer science when they are fixing a computer because they are using abduction when they decide what is probably causing a problem with the computer. The conclusion to explain computer data is not the work of the computer scientist, but the work of philosophers." It's quite easy to see why, when "computer scientist" is added, this objection fails. Historians and computer scientists do derive explanations of data when they consider data and while this may be inductive reasoning, they're working within their own field when they do so. The philosopher need not step in to make this conclusion.

From the Wikipedia page on historian:

The process of historical analysis involves investigation and analysis of competing ideas, facts and purported facts to create coherent narratives that explain "what happened" and "why or how it happened".

Here are some further debate resources:

Mike Licona vs. Dan Barker:

Bart Ehrman vs. William Lane Craig:

Bart Ehrman vs. Mike Licona:

Other related videos:

Miracles Prove Nothing

More on Miracles

Are Extraordinary Situations Indicative of Miracles?




I often hear the following stories during conversations with theists, "Well, this one event in my life was so improbable and extraordinary that there's no way it could have happened without some sort of divine intervention!"

Last night during a meetup with the Wilkes-Barre Interfaith Community, one of these stories were told and it went like this:

I was driving down a long road with some friends and family and was lost. I had no clue where I was and I was running out of gas. There wasn't a gas station anywhere and I was getting very worried. Someone in the car, a minister, prayed that we would find gas very soon and we decided to stop at the next house that had a light on. We pulled up and an old couple actually had a gas pump and gave us gas! Now I'm a math guy... and the chances of that are so extraordinary!

A first problem we have with anecdotal stories like this is that we really can't verify them - the story is limited to the individual or other individuals who were present. They could also all be fooled, stretching the details, etc. With a story like this, I don't think that there is some sort of lie going on and the person seemed credible. It's certainly not impossible to pull up to a house and gas, but I might be more suspicious if they said that a UFO landed and transferred some sort of space gas...

A second problem with stories like this is that people often count the "hits" and ignore the
"misses." We tend to notice when our prayers seemed to produce some sort of effect, but we don't really notice (or typically tell stories about) the failures. For instance, I'm sure you've heard people thinking "I was thinking of a friend and my phone rang! I knew it was him calling at it was!" How many times have you thought of a friend and received no phone call? How many times was it someone else? If we ran some sort of experiment where we drove down long random roads and happened to pray and stop at a first house with a light we saw, how many times would we get gas from people? The chances are very slim...but that time you were successful.

A third problem is that stories like this often are based on a false premise leading to a supposed conclusion. Perhaps the prayer had nothing to do with getting the gas. Just because you prayed does not mean that this was why you got the gas. What if you rubbed your head three times before you took a test? Would you credit the head rubbing with success? We're doing the same thing with the prayer here... In other words, correlation does not imply causation.

The largest and fourth problem with stories like this is that they are huge arguments from incredulity/ignorance. The idea that we have no explanation for why something happened does not mean that we can or should attribute a supernatural cause. I often hear comments like, "The universe is so amazing and we don't understand it...God must have made it!" Well, no...religion actually has a pretty bad track record at answering questions without current answers from the idea of the sun in the sky moving with a chariot, to Zeus striking people with lightning, and famine caused by lack of worship to a deity. If we don't know, we should simply say that we don't know and look for an answer instead of drawing a hasty conclusion.


A fifth problem related to the first is that the burden of proof is on the person making the claim. Some theists may try to say something like "Well, disprove it then! Explain how it happened! If you can't explain it it must be because God did it!" This response is ridiculous and it's so ridiculous that I've covered it in a previous blog post. Imagine that I told you that I can fly and manipulate street lights with my eyes. You would not accept me saying "Prove that I can't do it," so don't think that the theist is justified in trying this tactic when God is involved.

The above story may not seem to be very extraordinary, but I'll pose a different one for another example.

My sister was very sick for weeks. We developed a debilitating cancer and the doctors said she would only live for one more month. My family was praying for her and the cancer remitted! God must have intervened and saved her! There's no other explanation!

In a case like this, we can apply the four major problems above and look at the situation with a skeptical eye...but what about the doctors, what about the fact that cancer does remit?

This isn't about poking fun at people or being a dick, of course...but we really should think about situations like this. Millions of people have these stories like this to tell and attribute their god or supernatural beliefs to the answer to the mysteries...

For more coverage on prayer, please read my "Perils of Prayer" post and for more coverage on miracle claims, please read my post on that subject.

Don Tony, It's a-Jesus in a-Pizza!

Article: Pizzeria worker sees Jesus in sauce bucket on first Friday of Lent

View it here.

Shame on Times-Shamrock for publishing this "news" ...unless it's some big joke, but it's probably not.

When Mary Louise Salerno saw Jesus Christ in a bucket of pizza sauce, her instinct was not to alert the media or even to tell many friends.
She did not want people descending on her family's West Scranton pizzeria, and she did not want to invite critics or doubters of what she felt was a clear sign.
"To us, it was something special," Ms. Salerno, 65, of Old Forge said. "God smiled on us that day."


So, of all of the works, good things, and clear signs that your god who supposedly exists can be doing, he decides to "appear" on a bucket of pizza sauce.


What exactly is this a "sign" of, anyway? And why assume that some supernatural force has something to do with this? Don't you think that it is more plausible that pizza sauce dripped out of a bucket and formed some sort of image that looks like a man? We have a tendency to see faces and images in tree trunks, windows, and all sorts of items. We're bound to see "something" in patterns that look similar to images.

Bill Salerno, the owner of Brownie's and brother of Ms. Salerno, said he was skeptical until he saw it for himself. Maryann Marsico, who works at Brownie's, said even an atheist would find it unmistakable.


Actually, no. I'm an atheist and the image really looks nothing like what we associate Jesus with. If anything, this looks more like a Geico Caveman wearing a white t-shirt. What's even funnier is that the Jesus image we have from the Shroud of Turin is a forgery.

It was not lost on Ms. Marsico that Jesus appeared at Brownie's at the start of Lent, a holy Christian time that also happens to spur pizza sales because observers are not supposed to eat meat on Fridays.
"I will never cheat and eat meat again," she said.


Oh, yah, a time where Christians come to eat pizza...and now even more stupid people who believe this ludicrous image was a sign from God will eat at your pizza establishment. It's certainly good advertising (based on a lie). Let's be honest about this story...pizza sauce formed a pattern that people think looks like Jesus. It's no sign from God.


If you honestly believe that a supposed all-just, all-knowing, all-loving creator of the universe will be offended (it's a sin, right?) by meat eating on Friday, you need to get your priorities straight. Sure, some Catholics may choose to fast...but to think that meat eating is a sin that deserves punishment or feelings of guilt...? What kind of twisted morality is this?

Mr. Salerno, 55 and also from Old Forge, said he is not a churchgoing man but he is religious, and seeing Jesus on that pizza sauce bucket was all the proof he needs.


What exactly is this proof of, anyway? It's certainly all the proof I need to attest to the fact that the Salernos and other "pizza believers" are off their rockers.


Religion really makes many people crazy....and here's some very good proof of it. Suppose that the Salernos believed that Elvis came back from the dead and sent a sign of his image in pizza sauce, decided to report this to the media, and seriously believed it...we'd consider them crazy.

What about if they saw a sign from Zeus, The Flying Spaghetti Monster (would be plausible, it's in sauce after all!!), Lord Xenu, Poseidon, Joseph Smith, or Michael Jackson? Change the subject to Jesus, though, and all bets are off.

Anyway, let's laugh at some comments on this article: