William Lane Craig and The Problem of Evil

Prince Prospero from the horror film "The Masque of the Red Death" hints at the problem of evil.

Christian apologist and popular debater William Lane Craig doesn't think that the problem of evil -- a classic philosophical argument which seeks to undermine belief in the Christian god in light of natural disasters and suffering in the world -- is a problem. Craig has recently given a lecture concerning the problem of suffering and evil at Aalborg University in Denmark. I've watched it and have noticed that his responses to the problem of evil really haven't seemed to change since his debate with philosopher Kai Nielsen in February of 1991. This post will respond to a portion of Craig's opening statement from his 1991 debate and attempt to show why his response to the problem of evil is insufficient.

The problem of evil -- at a very basic understanding -- is well-informed by the above picture. The atheist who points to suffering in the world -- particularly natural disasters and diseases which kill people outright and lead to tremendous suffering -- sees evidence to assume that an all-loving, all-powerful, and all-knowing god (omni-god) does not exist. If an omni-god existed, some reason, it would not have created the universe in such a manner that guarantees natural disasters and diseases kill people and lead to a great deal of suffering. It is not only the case that God permits the disasters, but it is also the case -- as should be noted -- that God, if he exists, designed the universe which contains the disasters. 


It also isn't just some suffering that exists, but also an egregious amount of unnecessary suffering. Throughout this post, I'll use the term 'natural disasters' to abbreviate - but it is important to note that much suffering exists because of other factors such as degenerative diseases, mental illness, birth defects, random mutations of genes, and so on. None of what could be considered natural suffering, at least in this case, is the result of human action (and the atheist isn't arguing for God, for example, to intervene in the case of my stubbing a toe or even my driving a car into a tree following a drunken binge). 

An argument, then, along the lines of the problem of evil can be formed as follows:

(1) Egregious natural suffering, guaranteed by the natural laws of the universe, exists.
(2) An all-powerful, all-loving, all-knowing god is incompatible with (1).
(3) An all-powerful, all-loving, all-knowing god does not exist.

Premise one is quite obvious and needs no defense - Christians, even, do not deny premise one, but rather would object to premise two. The atheist can say that God could simply create a universe (and would do so) that is very much unlike ours - one in which an egregious amount of natural suffering does not exist. Why, one wonders, would a god that is all-loving, all-powerful, and all-knowing create this universe? Absent of reasons -- and with the seeming contradiction -- it seems to be the case that an all-powerful, all-loving, and all-knowing god does not exist. I could further elaborate on justification for premise two, but that shouldn't be needed here.

William Lane Craig, though, as you might expect, objects to premise two. He says, in his 1991 debate,

...we can actually prove that God and evil are logically compatible. You see, the atheist presupposes that God cannot have morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evil in the world. But this assumption is not necessarily true. So long as it is even possible that God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil, it follows that God and evil are logically consistent.

What, then, one wonders, could be these morally sufficient reasons that God might have which would show that God and evil are logically consistent? Craig doesn't offer any of these reasons, but rather says,

We are not in a good position to assess the probability of whether God has a morally sufficient reason for the evils that occur: As finite persons, we're limited in space, time, intelligence, and insight, but the omniscient and sovereign God, who sees the end from the beginning, providentially orders history so that His purposes are ultimately achieved through human free decisions. In order to achieve His ends, God may have to put up with evils along the way, which humans freely perpetrate. Evils which appear pointless to us within our limited framework may be seen to be justly permitted within God's wider framework. A brutal murder of an innocent man, for example, could produce a sort of ripple effect throughout history such that God's morally sufficient reason for permitting it might not emerge until centuries later or perhaps in another land. When you think of God's providence over the whole of history, then I think you can see how hopeless it is for limited observers to speculate on the probability that God could have a morally sufficient reason for permitting a particular evil. We're just not in a good position to assess such probabilities.

Note that above, Craig seems to focus on evils which "human freely perpetrate." This, though, is not the thrust (or even the argument) of the problem of evil as far as natural suffering is concerned. What we are dealing with here, or otherwise what seems to be contained in the most forceful argument, is natural suffering.

I have always found Craig's response -- paraphrased to 'we're not in a good position to judge whether God has a sufficient reason for evils that occur' -- to be quite interesting as it seems to be, despite what Craig says (in his above linked lecture), an 'appeal to mystery.' 'For all we know,' Craig seems to assert, 'God might just have a reason.' Absent of finding any sort of reason, seeing the evidence of an egregious amount of natural suffering in this world (and knowing that if the Christian god existed, he could create a world much different than ours), we have all reasons not to believe in the Christian god, it seems.

We understand that, as humans, our knowledge is quite limited. This, though, when dealing with objections to certain beliefs -- in the face of defeaters (reasons to undermine belief) to the beliefs -- shouldn't lead us to simply throw our hands in the air saying something to the effect of, "Well, for all we know..." Knowledge, as it overwhelmingly seems, is based on what we currently know based on observations and reasoning. We hold beliefs, or should hold beliefs, not on what might be, but rather based on what is and what we do know. Absent of reasons that the Christian god might have for designing and permitting an egregious amount of natural suffering, we should be led to the conclusion that the Christian god does not exist - 'natural evil' seems to serve as a defeater to Christian belief.

Craig's position -- and the position of every Christian who maintains that God may, 'for all we know,' have a good reason to design and permit natural suffering -- seems to lead one to the position of, which seems quite interesting in the face of Christians asserting that God is a benevolent being, 'moral agnosticism' or even moral nihilism. If, for all we know, God might have a reason to design and permit natural suffering, natural suffering, after all, might be a wonderful thing. On a Christian accounting, God is an all-loving being...so if God designed an earthquake which had killed hundreds of people, this must be a good thing.

Almost all adults (and children) in the world -- perhaps barring psychopaths -- agree that natural disasters are a terrible, horrible thing. The world would be so much of a better place, it so uncontroversially seems, without natural disasters. This intuition is quite strong and is reflected when persons grieve, donate money to relief efforts, and even try to deter natural disasters. To look at, for example, a tsunami that kills thousands and say, "Well, for all we know this could be a good thing. It might just have been the case that all of those people, for whatever reason, would have been responsible for great moral evils. God might have indeed permitted this, that makes sense" seems to be quite unreasonable - especially when considering the Christian god could achieve whatever 'ends' he desires by different means not including designing the universe with natural disasters.

Is the real concern, though, whether we are in the position to judge that God has no good reasons for permitting and designing natural suffering or, rather, is it the concern that the mere existence of egregious natural suffering poses as a defeater to Christian belief? I think it is the latter and that this whole 'are we in a position' talk is a distraction from the real issue at hand. Either way, it seems to be the case, with the omni-terms that Christians affix to the god they believe in, that we are in a position to judge that God has no reasons for permitting and designing natural suffering - especially in the case of him being able to design a different universe.

As Prince Prospero said in "The Masque of the Red Death," if a god of live ever did exist, he is long since dead (although someone, some thing doesn't seem to rule in its place).

My Twitter conversation with Rebecca Watson...and much more

Above are screen captures from Twitter in which I was responding to a conversation dealing with issues relating to Rebecca Watson failing to attend The Amazing Meeting because, in her own words, she was "called out as a problem" by D.J. Grothe [this post isn't about the merits of this evaluation, but I will assume it is true later in the post for sake of argument]. I proposed a hypothetical in my limited tweet to gauge what Rebecca Watson's response would be...and this was indicative of me, on Watson's account, telling her "what's best for [her] mental well-being." In this post, I will discuss the controversy surrounding sexual harassment and the discussion of such in addition to discussion of the above screen capture. I will also pursue and suggest options and attitudes, rather than failing to attend conventions, that atheists/skeptics can pursue. 

If you've been paying attention to my Facebook profile, Twitter feed, or the 'atheist/skeptic blogosphere,' you're likely aware that there have been many problems surrounding sexual harassment at atheist/skeptic conventions and the discussion surrounding said sexual harassment. To make a long story short and to avoid an extensive string of quoting people quoting people quoting people quoting people, D.J. Grothe -- the president of the James Randi Educational Foundation -- typed the following,

…this year only about 18% of TAM registrants so far are women, a significant and alarming decrease, and judging from dozens of emails we have received from women on our lists, this may be due to the messaging that some women receive from various quarters that going to TAM or other similar conferences means they will be accosted or harassed…I think this misinformation results from irresponsible messaging coming from a small number of prominent and well-meaning women skeptics who, in trying to help correct real problems of sexism in skepticism, actually and rather clumsily themselves help create a climate where women — who otherwise wouldn’t — end up feeling unwelcome and unsafe, and I find that unfortunate.

Following this comment and various others, Rebecca Watson -- shown above in the Twitter screen capture -- wrote a lengthy post titled "Why I won't be at TAM this year" in which she wrote, among other things (read the post itself for full details),

So it’s odd for me to be announcing that I will not attend TAM this year, because I do not feel welcomed or safe and I disagree strongly with the recent actions of the JREF president, DJ Grothe.
DJ was blaming women skeptics for creating an unwelcoming environment. I found that claim astonishing, since I was only aware of women speaking frankly about their own experiences and their own feelings. I couldn’t imagine that DJ would be literally blaming the victim for speaking out.  

Watson continued,

This is quite obviously not a safe space for me or for other women who want to be free of the gendered slurs and sexual threats and come-ons we experience in our day-to-day lives. But apparently, DJ thinks I am lying about that, since apparently my feeling that the freethought community is not a safe space is “misinformation.” I should apparently put on a smile and pretend it doesn’t happen, because by reporting on my treatment, I am creating “a climate where women — who otherwise wouldn’t — end up feeling unwelcome and unsafe.” 

DJ says I am the one doing that. Me, who has never discouraged people from attending TAM and in fact has given thousands of dollars to the JREF in order to send more and more women to the event. Me, who has never said that TAM is a dangerous place for women. I’m the problem.

Let's grant, for sake of argument, that Rebecca Watson's evaluation of the situation (that she is indeed being blamed by Grothe, atheist/skeptic conventions are not safe spaces, and that her interpretation of Grothe's comments is accurate) is a flawless interpretation. Should this, though, be a good reason for Rebecca Watson (and other female or even male skeptics) to fail to attend atheist/skeptic conventions? Do better options exist?

It should be quite uncontroversial to assert that there is disagreement -- ranging from minor to severe -- amongst individuals in the atheist/skeptic community. Some might not like person a's 'friendly approach' and believe that person z's focus on church/state issues is misplaced. Some, for example, might not like the tactics or comments of organization b...or perhaps might not be a fan of organization b's staff. Person c may similarly repulse some people for various reasons. Perhaps some people might not like the comments of person d. Maybe it's the case that people view atheist/skeptic speakers as 'too militant' and claim that their strategies are counter-intuitive. Maybe it's the case that people view atheist/skeptic speakers as 'too accomodating' and claim that their strategies are counter-intuitive. Whatever. One can't be happy with all of the organizers, leaders, representatives, etc. in the atheist/skeptic movement and might even have serious disagreements with some particular individuals or organizations ranging from what one construes as personal attacks to minor disagreements about focus...so should an effective response, then, be to pull support from a convention in whatever manner one elects?

In an attempt to see if Rebecca Watson's logic -- not attending a convention because, as her chief complaint seems to be, she has an extreme disagreement with one of the convention's organizers -- should be applied for everyone or anyone in cases in which there is an extreme disagreement or when one has been told -- as I noted -- 'really shitty things,' I sent a Tweet to her with a hypothetical statement reading, "I've been told really shitty things from rep's of an atheist organization. Should I also not go to those cons?" Her reply was, "Like seriously, what gave you the right to tell me what's best for my mental well-being? Fuck that." 

Admittedly, I didn't have high hopes of a genuine conversation [one in which both persons are open to discussion, receptive of criticism, willing to 'step back' and self-reflect when faced with objections] coming from Watson because my attempt in the past to express skepticism with her reasoning* did not yield a genuine conversation on her behalf, but rather led to her distorting what I was saying, levying personal attacks, and similarly employing 'mind reading tactics.' I felt it, though, necessary to express skepticism in this case because the situation has gotten really out of hand from many 'sides.'

It should be quite apparent that Watson didn't answer my question posed in the above tweet and distorted what I was saying. It also seems to be the case that she was employing 'mind reading tactics' in which she was attempting to gauge my intentions (on her account, my telling her what is best for her mental well-being) when all she had to work with was a simple tweet with less than 200 characters (and, to be fair, I've commented on the issue before, but in no instance was I 'telling her what is best for her mental well-being'). I  failed to receive a 'yes,' 'no,' or some commentary that seemed to address my question, but rather was met with Watson implying that I am telling her how to feel [and strangely questioning my 'right' (whatever that means) to express skepticism. I have no idea what this means because I obviously don't lack the ability to type something and I don't find any good reason to suggest that my expressing skepticism is an improper invasive thing to do especially considering it seems to be the case that Watson is publicly claiming Grothe (although by using sarcasm) is suggesting she 'put on a smile' and not talk about sexual harassment].

Watson, by the available evidence (although admittedly limited although perhaps sufficient enough to draw conclusions) seemed to have a previously-held bias when encountering criticism of those who question her; instead of being open to the possibility of people engaging on an honest inquiry, she assumed that those who disagree with her or express skepticism have malicious intentions in which they are expressing what is best for her mental well-being (and know what is best for others) or -- more simply -- telling her how to feel. Watson apparently, at least in this case, is assuming that disagreement people express is an attack and a suggestion that other people know what is best for her. The abilities to self-reflect and challenge one's ideas quite unfortunately seem to be lacking in this situation...and that's quite interesting because I have written at length about how people I have encountered or have encountered my work -- often closed-minded theists -- construe disagreement as disrespect and an attack on one's character while jumping to wild conclusions about the intentions of others.

Criticism of Watson's ideas, it seems, at least in this situation, is out-of-bounds, impermissible, and automatically means that people who are raising objections are telling others how to feel. Of course it can't possibly be the case that someone sees a flaw with her reasoning, poses a reductio ad absurdum to help her perhaps discover this flaw, wants to express some skepticism to better understand her position, or perhaps wants to pose a defeater to a certain course of action (I can use sarcasm, too). 

--

Simply put, if the correct or advisable course of action (such that Watson is taking) -- when following extreme disagreement with someone involved with a convention -- is to stay home and refuse to attend [and many women would be justified in responding similarly], convention attendance would go sharply down, less women would be represented at atheist/skeptic conventions (isn't this the goal?), less new convention attendees come out, less community building is possible, etc. Other options -- and better options -- exist.

Amidst the entire discussion about sexual harassment at conventions, one should assume (and quite uncontroversially so), that sexual harassment happens at conventions (much of it, I would wager, being unreported) and that certain 'creepers' exist. Said 'creepers' exist in the skeptic community and -- no matter how much education -- people are going to behave really poorly. It's obviously the case that some people -- whether the situation is a gaming, atheist, skeptic, or science convention -- are going to behave poorly/that incidents are going to happen and, if they don't happen, there's a chance that they will - this is an assumed danger for mostly all people. A better response, then, it seems -- or at least some ideas I and others have -- should be proactive behavior such as staying in groups with friends, being vigilant and unafraid to confront harassers, remove yourself from hostile or unwelcome situations, notifying security/convention organizers of problems, and pressing (and rightfully so) convention organizers to have firm policies and make sure to keep records of complaints.

I additionally wonder...if Watson's prime reason for not attending TAM is, as it seems to be, extreme disagreement with someone who plays a major role in a convention, would people be similarly justified in failing to attend [and perhaps even encouraging others to not attend] conventions in which Watson has a major role? Should people sit home and fail to attend conventions in which Watson is a part of because they have extreme disagreements with her? It's obviously the case that I have extreme disagreements with Watson (on this issue and many more), but should my course of action -- in light of the extreme disagreement -- be to have nothing to do with conventions in which she plays a major role? I think not. If you similarly think not, why should Watson's reasoning be justified/an appropriate reaction?

To perhaps 'test' this, I asked Watson if I should stay home and refuse to attend conventions because I disliked the comments of, as I proposed, Lawrence Krauss (and this is the case because of his outright dismissal of philosophy and philosophers at American Atheists' 2012 convention although he later clarified following a wide deal of criticism). Her response, not addressing my question, was "Yah, remember that time you gave Lawrence Krauss $10k & then he called you out as a problem? That was rough." Perhaps Watson's disagreement with Grothe is made more severe in light of, as she says, a donation of $10,000 dollars [and in previous instances a high level of support for Grothe's initiatives]? This is interesting to consider. I responded writing, "Would the situation really be so much different if you hadn't contributed 10k? Wouldn't you similarly be upset." To that, I got no response...and ended up -- as it seems -- being blocked by Watson on Twitter.

As sexual harassment continues to be a problem and individuals continue to disagree with leaders in the skeptic/atheist movement, the response of failing to attend conventions (and seemingly discouraging others to attend) doesn't appear to be a proper response. Interestingly enough, failing to attend conventions when one was previously likely to attend seems to -- as was initially the point of contention -- make the problem of women being lowly represented at conventions worse - and it's not because Watson spoke up about harassment, but rather how she handled the situation when other what seem to be more viable and effective options/responses exist for her to deal with conflict, harassment, and problems in the atheist/skeptic community (especially considering she has such big platform/audience). Although I don't have the financial means to do so at the moment (and because of some other considerations preventing my participation), I would love to attend TAM ... and also participate in other conventions with people in the skeptic/atheist community although I might have severe disagreements with people who play major roles in them. I can perhaps tolerate others' behavior, perhaps be angry and ignore, and/or simply realize that there exist people with whom I have severe disagreements while also understanding said people reach particular people and do a tremendous amount of good (even considering some instances of bad) for society. 

* This wouldn't be the first time in which Rebecca Watson failed to engage in a fair discussion. In the past -- when I expressed skepticism about a claim made by Rebecca Watson and talked about by many others in the atheist/skeptic community -- it seemed that my efforts were a waste of time; I gained no insight, commenters who responded to me didn't really seem to answer what I was saying, and Rebecca Watson didn't seem to be willing to have a thoughtful discussion that was a charitable reading of my comments. ...and in this case, we weren't limited to short tweets...and there was an extended conversation. When I voiced skepticism about the general assertion that a poll with five men is indicative of a sexist pollmaker or otherwise an instance of someone 'forgetting about women,' I was told that I have a 'pretty sad problem' and that 'I couldn't think of a single woman.' Later clarification of the 'I couldn't think of a single woman' phrase were followed with 'I decided not to,' that I 'didn't know women were half of the population,' and what seemed to be threats of banning because of my "evasion and general thick-headedness." Following me stating lack of a woman in a poll of five persons doesn't seem to be a huge problem because of the small size of the poll, Watson claimed that I believe there should be 25 men on a poll before one woman was included.

A response to those who claim offense

(A fitting poster for this post...)

It's often the case that people are quick to respond to content or people they happen to disagree with with a 'sit down and shut up' mentality in which they believe that certain ideas just shouldn't be discussed. Is this an appropriate attitude to have? In a pluralistic society, I argue, claiming offense and objecting to content -- simply because you happen not to like it -- is unacceptable and immature.

Throughout my 'career' as a 'professional atheist' [a label, expressed with derision, that WILK Newsradio host Steve Corbett used to dismissively refer to me on a recent episode of his radio show] many people -- no matter how mild my tone is or how much I write that persons should not interpret disagreement as disrespect -- claim that my work is offensive. Some people even go so far as to assert that I should cease publishing content, criticizing religious ideas, and simply just 'sit down and shut up.' I've posted several responses to these concerns in the past, but wish to, in this post, hopefully put this issue of offense and objections to my work to rest.

Possible motivations and problems

I believe that many assertions of offense and general objections to my work are hasty responses that are the result of an emotional reaction and a belief that cherished ideas should not be dissected. In a world with so much disagreement and sequestering of ourselves -- despite, ironically enough, the openness of the internet and the increased exposure people can have to different ideas -- perhaps some believe that we should just 'live and let live' and mainly communicate with those who are like-minded. Not enough exposure, perhaps, might be a reason that people have such a difficult time dealing with ideas foreign to them.

Perhaps a hellish mix of misplaced or misunderstood aims of diversity and truth relativism (the notion that truth is relative from individual to individual and/or that there is no such thing as objective truth) has unfortunately led people to believe that everyone can be right about any issue, all beliefs are ultimately one's opinion, and that it's simply just rude to disagree with anyone. Ironically, some efforts to 'draw people together' and find common ground seem to be responsible for causing much harm and intellectual suicide. In the name of what some consider to be tolerance and diversity, some have blissfully placed their brains in blenders and have not achieved a degree of tolerance worth wanting.

Additionally, the ever-returning and often mentioned [in this blog, at least] 'right to opinion' might also be a culprit serving as a barrier to honest discussion...

Cognitive dissonance, the sensation/experience felt when one happens to seemingly hold contradictory beliefs or becomes exposed to information which runs counter to their beliefs, can be difficult to deal with. It seems quite easy to 'throw up the smokescreens' and become defensive when our beliefs challenged and it seems quite difficult to overcome the easy response and, instead of becoming defensive, 'step back' from our ideas and even do so much as to consider another point of view. Perhaps cognitive dissonance is responsible for the attitude of deflection of criticisms?

The general responses of "you shouldn't talk about that" or "you should just leave these ideas alone" that often seem to come from those who object with offense to certain content are often quite short and without explanation or argument (and hopefully I'm not a victim of confirmation bias here). When these comments are made, I typically ask for persons to explain their reasoning and elaborate, but they fail to do so. If persons respond -- after I defend myself, expand on my ideas, and further clarify my reasoning pertaining to the issue at hand -- original objectors continue to, instead of responding to the content, object to a discussion about certain matters even taking place (while the discussion is taking place).

This 'methodology' is not a sign -- it seems -- of an honest discussion in which the objecting party is looking for a conversation; this seems to be characteristic of a hit-and-run tactic paired with an insufficient concern for truth and intellectual laziness. One would expect that people who were willing enough to object to my work would be willing to have an honest discussion if they were willing enough to post and were genuinely offended [perhaps seeking to squelch the content], but this unfortunately isn't the case. Perhaps I am giving people too much credit.

Some philosophy might save us...

In his book "The View From Nowhere," philosopher Thomas Nagel explains how difficult it can be to critically self-reflect and how impossible it might be to 'separate ourselves' from our beliefs. A state of total objectivity -- it appears -- is something we just can't reach as human beings, but we can try our best to work toward objectivity - and with good reason. Self-reflection and a willingness to modify our beliefs -- provided good reason, argument, and evidence are presented that justifies a cognitive shift -- is essential to being an intellectually-minded individual and perhaps even a productive mature functioning member of society.

What good would life be if we never amended our beliefs or realized our errs? We all make mistakes or might happen to hold incorrect ideas for whatever reasons (often no fault of our own) and that's nothing to be ashamed of. What should be considered shameful, though, is an unwillingness to amend our beliefs and a closed-minded attitude. Realizing that our beliefs were inaccurate and considering a new perspective shouldn't be something that we avoid, but rather should be something we embrace. I call this progress, openness, and a concern for truth.

In a 'marketplace of ideas' and a pluralistic society that is not filled with 'yes men' or 'yes woman,' some people will feel offended or provoked by certain content because people regard their beliefs as important self-identifying characteristics and view 'threats' to their beliefs as character attacks. Someone is bound to claim offense when issues such as worldviews and religions are being scrutinized. Before claiming offense, though, or acting in an immature fashion -- especially when content with quite a mild tone is being considered -- people ought to realize that disagreement is inevitable. Just about anyone can claim to be offended by just about anything, so the questions that should be considered are "Is it reasonable for me to claim offense?" and "What should the response be to content I consider offensive?" before people jump to unreasonable conclusions and make unreasonable demands for others to cease expressing their ideas.

One person's 'offensive content' is the next person's 'telling it like it is' that is, as some may see it, quite uncontroversial. With a sea of differing value judgments and barometers as to what is appropriate and inappropriate, it seems futile to protest to anything and everything out there. While there may be no objective standard for what can be considered offensive (mainly, perhaps, because this is an issue of personal taste and there is no quick-and-dirty way to distinguish 'offensive' from 'not offensive'), we shouldn't despair. The proper reaction to what one considers to be offensive, then, considering mentioned issues, is a mature attitude in which one realizes that people will happen to disagree - and disagreement shouldn't force or otherwise demand people to cease from publishing 'any old content.'

Offense isn't the goal, but progress should be

It's difficult for me to identify a single or primary motivation -- if one even exists -- pertaining to why I do what I do, but I can say that I don't write with an intention to offend people, provoke, or make people upset. Writing -- what seems to be my main focus as far as my involvement in the secular community is concerned -- can serve many different purposes such as highlighting bigotry, inspiring people to work toward change, and helping people to understand where certain people are 'coming from' outside of the quick soundbytes and short tweets (although these can be helpful). I like to author longer posts, although they may not be read by as many people if the posts happened to be shorter, in order to allow people to understand my reasoning and further the conversation.

Self-reflection and exposure to new ideas can be a learning experience, a catalyst toward progress, an 'opening door' to new opportunities, a chance to defend one's beliefs and respond to thoughtful objections, and so much more. Instead of claiming offense and avoiding discussion with people, engaging oneself can be quite fulfilling and productive even thought it may seem uncomfortable. If all else fails and engaging with new ideas is too much to handle -- or persons simply just don't want to engage with ideas -- persons can simply 'take the high road' instead of objecting to ideas being voiced with a substantive response.

It seems to be more important that people -- if we were forced with one option over another -- live together than agree on everything. Disagreement is inevitable, so we ought to be able to respond to people and ideas we might happen to disagree with in an intellectually mature and honest manner. Living together, while it may seem very difficult, seems to be much more possible than a successful effort for humans to agree on all issues. Having honest discussions and interacting with people whom we might happen to disagree with seems to allow for our own intellectual progress and understanding of other people. Instead of glibly claiming offense and asserting that others should 'sit down and shut up,' let's assume a mature attitude and be realistic.

As always, comments are welcome. Sharing this post on Twitter, Facebook, Google Plus, and wherever else (click below to share!) is also appreciated.

If you're interested in my thoughts (and the thoughts of Rodney Collins) on another related and often overlapping matter, 'respecting beliefs,' please listen to Episode 9 of the NEPA Freethought Society Podcast titled, as you might have guessed, "Respecting Beliefs" in audio and/or video formats.

New video episodes of NEPA Freethought Society Podcast available!

Returning from a hiatus, the NEPA Freethought Society is providing new and old viewers alike with THREE new episodes! Watch below:

'Respecting beliefs' (and right to opinion and taking offense)

Watch live streaming video from nepafreethought at livestream.com

'Religion and the workplace' discussion with Karla Porter

Watch live streaming video from nepafreethought at livestream.com

Interview with melodic death metal band Ethereal Collapse

Watch live streaming video from nepafreethought at livestream.com

Tebow 3:16 - God Doesn’t Help Tebow Win

This post is from a guest contributer who wishes to remain anonymous.

This Tebow thing is really getting out of hand. I thought it might have ended when his winning streak ended and the Broncos lost to the Patriots, but in this weekend’s wild card game, it happened again. Tebow threw about a 10 yard pass through dropped coverage that was run 70 yards for a touchdown in the first play of overtime. This meant, given NFL rules, the Steelers wouldn’t even get a possession to try to answer, so the Broncos advanced into the playoffs…to play the Patriots, again.

As you probably know, Tebow is the starting quarterback for the Denver Broncos. They have had a 'string of luck' lately—quite a few comeback, fourth quarter, and overtime wins. Of course, in the NFL, unlikely and quirky wins happen all the time. And when they do, people are usally critical. When teams win by barely beating teams with comebacks after quarters of terrible play, most people aren’t keen on singing your praises. Things, though, are different with Tebow. Why? Because he’s Christian. I mean really REALLY Christian. He was home schooled, so he has really had his religious beliefs beaten into him. He hosts an evangelically motivated website, 'wrote' similarly motivated books and has helped with his father’s missionary work in the Philippines... to help circumcise impoverished children. He also appeared in a pro-life commercial during the 2011 Super Bowl. When Tebow played for the Florida Gators, he wrote Bible verse references in his eye paint. Eye paint messages are not allowed in the NFL, but as a Bronco, Tebow has been regularly seen bowing down in petitionary prayer during games’ crucial moments and in prayers of gratitude right after touchdowns, often pointing up to heaven as he stands up, mouthing the words “thank you.” (This is now known as “Tebowing.”) As a result, many are inclined—without hyperbole—to attribute Bronco winning streaks to divine intervention.

The notion that the Bronco wins are a result of divine intervention has received a lot of attention. Saturday Night Live made fun of the notion the night before the Broncos lost to the Patriots in the regular season. Conan O’Brien reenacted the overtime pass against the Stealers with his peanut players having the hand of Jesus come down and guide the football into the receiver’s hand. ()

But to many—in fact to most—it’s not a joke; people who think that God is involved in Tebow’s wins are not joking and really think God is helping Tebow win. If you have any Christian football fans as Facebook friends, you know what I am talking about. If you watch a game, you will see many signs around the stadium that say “we believe.” Although they may simply have 'faith in their team,' the message seems to be more specific. They believe that Tebow has bestowed God’s favor onto the Broncos and that it will take them to the Super Bowl. Colorado pastor Wayne Hanson -- who has some connections to Tebow’s family -- just came right out and said it, “It’s not luck. Luck isn’t winning 6 games in a row. It’s favor. God’s favor.” Countless media outlets have echoed these thoughts.

The most recent game added to the hype. According to an ABC affiliate, Tebow passed for 316 yards, averaged 31.6 yards per completion, and the ratings for the game peaked at 31.6 at the very moment that Tebow threw the game winning touchdown. A Bible verse that Tebow often painted in his eye black when he was a Gator was (you guessed it) John 3:16. It is often considered the quintessential evangelical Bible verse. This has many seriously wondering whether God had a hand in the game’s stats. Since the NFL bans messages painted in eye black, could God be sending his own message? If so, it worked. “John 3:16,” according to the article, was the number one Google search on Monday, getting more hits than it ever has.

But does Tebow really think that God has a hand in his wins? Many Tebow fans want to deny this and say that he’s just thanking God for his talents while he is “Tebowing,” but it is quite difficult to maintain such a position given the evidence that Tebow gives us. When you always bow down in prayer during crucial moments of the games, and then when things go right you stand up, point to the sky, and say “thank you,” what else could you be doing but asking God for help and then thanking him once you get it? Why would you be thanking God for the chance to play or for your talents, in the most vital moments of the game? Is Tebow ecstatically jumping up and down after beating the Steelers, and then bowing down, thinking to himself “I’m so glad I’m talented. Thank Jesus?” In answer to a question about the Broncos' overtime win over Chicago, Tebow said, "I believe in a big God and special things can happen." Tebow may even believe that a Super Bowl win is preordained by God. "It's not necessarily prophesying, but sometimes you can feel God has a big plan,” he said. Tebow thinks God has a hand in his wins.

Bill O’Reilly, in an interview back in June, asked Tebow, “Do you pray for victory?” Tebow replied,

You know, I think He honestly does care about how we play on the field, more than anything more than win or lose our hearts on the field. On the field I'm trying to play for the glory of God but then also I'm trying to give everything I have and win and compete. And so I think more than just winning or losing, I think He cares about where our hearts are when we're playing.

Well, at least God has his priorities in order. According to Tebow, God cares more about 'Tebow’s heart' when he is playing than whether he wins. But he clearly still cares whether he wins. It’s really hard to deny that Tebow indeed does think God has a hand in his victories.

Even if Tebow doesn’t believe, his teammates do—teammates like Wesley Woodyard. He recounted to Mark Kiszla at the Denver Post Tebow’s message to him.

Tebow came to me and said, 'Don't worry about a thing,' because God has spoken to him." After Woodyard ripped the ball from Chicago's Marion Barber’s hand to prevent him from winning the game, Woodyard believes too. "I gave him a big hug,” said Woodyard, “and told him thank you. God speaks to people to reach other people.

If you want to think that Tebow doesn’t believe that God has a hand in his wins, fine. I’ve said enough about that, but it’s undeniable that a number of people do believe. They think that God is altering the outcome of his games—right down to the number of yards he passes for, to make people Google John 3:16. It’s this issue I want to examine. Is it rational to believe that God intervenes in Tim Tebow’s football games?

The simple answer is a resounding no. In fact, such a belief is about as irrational as you can get. Let’s talk about those “316” stats first.

They are interesting, but not remarkable. From what I can tell, they are accurate. He did throw for 316 yards. But he also completed 10/21 passes. Divide 316 by 10, and you get 31.6. So it’s not really two different independent occurrences of “316” because one derives from the other. But, although the overnight household ratings for the game were 25.9/46, the game did peak at 31.6/46 from 8:00-8:15 PM, ET. Although, Tebow was making his pass around that time, I highly doubt that the ratings spike happened at the moment that Tebow made the pass, as was reported above. It was probably after, when the 'Twitterverse' lit up with 9000 tweets a second, and more people tuned in as a result.

Thinking the “316” coincidences entail divine intervention is thinking at its most uncritical. What are the odds that Tebow would pass for exactly 316? Not that great. Chances the ratings would peak at 31.6 on the same night? Even lower. But, given the number of games that Tebow has played, will play, and the number of stats that are kept in NFL games, it is a guarantee that eventually one of his stats would equal some number that people would find significant. Maybe he could complete 4/16 passes in homage to Philippians 4:16, another bible verse that Tebow has painted in his eye black. (I hadn’t heard anyone claiming 3:16 is his favorite verse until now.) And it wouldn’t be too hard to find another instance of those numbers hiding in the slew of stats for any given game.

The fallacy involved in this kind of thinking involves anomaly hunting and a selection bias—we look for something remarkable, remember what we found, and forget all the unremarkable things we passed over. Sure, 316 yards is interesting…but how many stats, over all the games, have been completely insignificant? We don’t remember those. Just like when a psychic medium gets something right, and we remember it—and we forget the twenty other things that she just said that have nothing to do with anything. Keep looking and eventually you’ll find what you want.

But something else is very wrong with the “316 yards—it’s a sign!” mentality. Think about what it really entails. To get Tebow to throw exactly 316 yards, God would have had to control every minute detail of the game. Anyone going anywhere they are not supposed to, catching a throw they are not supposed to catch, or where they are not supposed to catch it, would ruin it all. The idea that God reaches down from heaven to make sure that Tebow’s pass gets to the receiver to win the game is already ridiculous enough—so ridiculous that when Conan portrays it literally on his show, we laugh out loud. But to think that God is directing every little aspect of a football game to make sure that Tebow gets 316 yards in exactly 10 throws [so when it’s divided by 10 the numbers don’t change] is just so stupid.

Not to mention—is God making everyone turn their TV on so that he gets exactly the 31.6 rating that he wants? Whatever happened to free will?

Many religious people will argue that, indeed, God does control every aspect of the game—and that he did make you turn on your TV. Why? Because God controls everything. So the idea that God has a hand in Tebow’s wins, and the 316 stats, is not crazy at all. Instead, it simply follows logically from the fact that God exists, they suggest.

But this is a highly controversial and widely criticized view of God and his nature. The idea that God predestines everything that occurs (including who goes to heaven, and who goes to hell) was argued for by John Calvin. But the idea runs afoul of many bible verses, not to mention many Christian ideas—like the fact that we are morally responsible for what we do. If everything I do, I do merely because God preordained—predetermined—that I would do it, then how is anything I do my fault? I can’t do anything but what God ordained I would do and the reason I do it ultimately has nothing to do with me or my decisions. If God makes me do it, then I’m not morally responsible. We usually wouldn’t think that you are morally responsible if you had to do something because someone had a gun pointed at your head. How much more so if God is literally controlling you like a puppet?

This idea also runs afoul of a common Christian apologetic move. The problem of evil asks how God could exist when there is so much evil in the world. A common reply is that the evil in the world is not the work of God—it is our work. We cause evil by our own free choices. Not all evil is the result of our free choices—no one has ever caused a tornado. So this solution doesn’t completely answer the problem. But it can’t solve anything if all our actions are predetermined by God. We can’t cause any evil if God makes us do what we do—if he does all our causing for us. Certainly, you can’t shift any blame off of God, onto us, for the evil in the world, if God predetermines all of it to happen.

Now, of course, football players’ performances are most often morally neutral—they aren’t out there causing good or evil. But here’s the thing. Christians maintain that when God doesn’t intervene in our free will decisions to prevent evil, like 9/11, it’s because free will is important. It must be protected and preserved. What, then, are we to make of the suggestion that God interferes with the free will of football players to make sure that a particular team wins? We must think it is absurd. If preventing 9/11 is not more important than preserving free will, certainly a football win is not either—no, not even a Tebow win. Not even if the win is a means by which God draws attention to himself or a bible verse.

To make things worse, the kind of reasoning that people are employing to conclude that God is helping Tebow is the worst kind. In a nutshell, it is an appeal to ignorance. An appeal to ignorance occurs when one interjects a supernatural explanation for something that they can’t explain. This happens when people conclude that Criss Angel is magic because they can’t explain how he does his tricks. [Criss Angel is actually very honest about the fact that he is an illusionist, and has no supernatural powers—just like all magicians don’t.] But what’s more likely: no natural explanation or that you simply can’t think of one?

But it’s worse than that because the events for which people are invoking supernatural explanations don’t even need supernatural explanations. They are not miraculous; they are not violations of the natural order. If one of Tebow’s passes had disappeared in mid-air and then just appeared in the arms of a receiver in the end zone—then you might have something. But fourth quarter comebacks and overtime wins happen all the time—not to mention 316 yard stats. (Just Google it and see how many other 316 yard passing games you can find.)

Concluding that Tebow threw 316 yards because God made him is like concluding that prime empty spot in a parking lot is a result of divine intervention. Sure, it’s possible that God could have caused whoever parked there to cut their shopping trip to Wal-Mart short so they would leave and vacate a spot just when you needed it. But what’s more likely—divine intervention or the simple fact that someone with a good spot left Wal-Mart of their own accord around the time that you arrived? It is more likely that God intervened in the game to make sure that Tebow threw exactly 316 yards or that, just like hundreds of quarterbacks before him, Tebow simply threw for 316 yards?

The fact that people are really taking this seriously, I’m afraid, only reveals the childishness of religious thinking. Non-religious people are not drawing this conclusion. And, to be fair, not all religious people are either. (Rev. Alan Rundick denies it, but also thinks that Tebow denies it too. But there is a particular brand of religious person who takes this seriously and I think this demonstrates the kind of childish thinking that is involved in this kind of religion. Children think magicians are magic, adults know they are illusionists. Children are fascinated by history channel specials on Nostradamus, adults know that it’s all retrodiction. Children can be fascinated by the fact that Tebow threw for 316 yards, but adults should not.

But I also think this reveals the kind of god that these people worship. For the god that they revere, given the kind of things they think he does, it makes perfect sense to them that God would make Tebow throw for 316 yards. It also probably makes sense to them that God would free up a spot in the parking lot for them. Nietzsche spoke of such a god in his work, “The Antichrist.”

…what shall we do when [believers]… use the finger of God to convert their miser ably commonplace and huggermugger existence into a miracle of grace, a providence and an experience of salvation? The most modest exercise of the intellect, not to say of decency, should certainly be enough to convince these interpreters of the perfect childishness and unworthiness of such a misuse of the divine digital dexterity. However small our piety, if we ever encountered a god who always cured us of a cold in the head at just the right time, or got us into our carriage at the very instant heavy rain began to fall, he would seem so absurd a god that he’d have to be abolished even if he existed. God as a domestic ser vant, as a letter carrier, as an almanac-manat bottom, he is a mere name for the stupidest sort of chance....

If he were writing today, Nietzsche would have also mentioned football games.

A god who simply stands in for explanations of chance occurrences—especially chance occurrences that are bound to happen eventually anyway—is a childish invention, unworthy of worship. Christians who invoke God to explain Tebow’s success, who think that God even cares about football games, much less intervenes in them, do themselves and their entire religion a disservice. They trivialize God, trivialize religious belief, and they revitalize Tebow’s success.


P.S. Some have suggested that Tebow, and those like him,don’t pray to win—they just pray for everyone in the game to be safe and injury-free. There are three things to say about this: (1) He’s not doing that when he is bowing down on the sideline as the kicker lines up for the winning field goal. (2) God’s doing a pretty crappy job of keeping everyone safe, given the rise of concussions in football and the average survival rate of NFL players. (3) Praying for everyone in the game to be safe makes just about as much sense as praying for a win. Players are injured by the actions of others players. To keep everyone safe, God would have to make all the players be just where he wanted them to be—in other words, we would have to interfere with their free will. And, as we discussed above, he doesn’t do that. Unless you are asking God to not snap the cables of the overhead camera and make it fall on someone for shits and giggles, praying for safety at a football game doesn’t make much sense.

God and the Gettier Problem: If God existed, was theistic belief justified?

In a short essay titled Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, philosopher Edmund Gettier raised some concerns about, as you may have guessed, justified true belief and knowledge. For this post, I'd like to explore how Gettier's essay relates to belief in God. If God happened to exist, can Christians rightly claim the 'high ground' and say that their belief in God was justified while atheists' lack of belief was unjustified?

Reflecting on Gettier's essay, we realize that it's quite possible to have sufficient evidence to believe a proposition and be correct even though the evidence did not lead to the truth value of the proposition. Suppose, for example, that I show you a good deal of evidence for you to be justified in believing that I own a Jeep. You believe that you are justified in believing that I own a Jeep and base your belief on the given evidence...but it turns out that your belief was correct despite the evidence you were shown. The reality of the situation – unknown to both me and you – was that I bought the Jeep from a dealer who had forged documents and had stolen the Jeep and someone named Kevin really owned the Jeep, but unbeknownst to me and you, I won a raffle on the same day you believed I owned a Jeep. In short, your belief that I owned a Jeep was correct, but for 'all the wrong reasons.' You simply were 'lucky' and arrived at a justified true belief because of chance.

Likewise, it's totally possible to be very justified in lacking belief in a given proposition and happen to be wrong for some unknown and perhaps unlikely reason. Consider Peter Popoff. Popoff is a televangelist who was exposed as a fraud during the days of The Tonight Show with Johnny Carson by skeptic James Randi. Popoff claimed to be able to cure diseases persons had and also claimed to have a direct link with God that allowed him to know details of persons such as their home addresses and what ailments they had. Randi discovered that Popoff had advance information about audience members and received said information from his wife via an earpiece.

We're quite justified in believing that Popoff was a charlatan and didn't have a direct link with God because we have a naturalistic and very plausible alternative explanation. Suppose, though, that Popoff really did have a link with God and the earpiece was simply a backup just in case God decided not to relay information to Popoff. Despite our justification in lacking belief that Popoff spoke with God, we actually were wrong. Was our lack of belief in Popoff's claims of speaking with God unjustified? Can 'Popoff believers' be considered intellectually praiseworthy?

Many Christians believe that their belief in God is justified even though they appeal to different reasons, many of the arguments given are deeply problematic, faith doesn't constitute knowledge, and much more. Some rely on Pascal's Wager – the idea, roughly, that we 'should elect to believe' in the Christian god because there is no way to 'know' whether God exists or not, so we ought to believe rather than disbelieve and face punishment – to somehow substantiate their belief in God. Whatever the reason, Christians believe that God exists. All of the standard reasons, it seems, are not sufficient to establish belief in God; many of the given arguments and reasons to believe in the Christian god, it seems, have been thoroughly 'debunked.'

Suppose, though, that the Christian god actually did exist and not one person's reason to warrant belief was justified. Suppose the Christian god actually did have sufficient reasons to create a universe with laws that guarantee random killing of persons through diseases, natural disasters, and much more; the problem of evil turned out to no longer be a problem. Suppose that the Christian god had a sufficient reason to remain hidden despite some obvious reasons that he should have to reveal himself.

Suppose that one day, the Christian god decided to utterly reveal himself so that almost everyone believed. Suppose he materialized in human form, submitted himself to all of our tests, and made non-belief an unreasonable position on par with belief that aliens created Olyphant, PA [or insert your favorite wacky claim here]. Perhaps, if he did not manifest in human form and provide very good reasons for humans to believe he existed, he simply happened to exist in an afterlife of sorts. At this point, should the persons who believe in the Christian god be intellectually praiseworthy for their belief? Can Christians rightly poke fun at non-Christians and call them fools as the Bible does?

If the Christian god exists, Christians have no justification whatsoever to claim that they are intellectually praiseworthy because their previous ideas that they believed led to justification for belief in the Christian god were not sufficient to warrant belief. These Christians were simply lucky and the non-Christians were justified in not believing that the Christian god existed.

**

Enter the concept of Hell, perhaps one of the most immoral and absurd parts of the Christian belief system – at least as understood by most laypersons. Hell, for the purposes of this post, is where non-Christians go to be tortured for eternity after they die for not believing that the Christian god exists [and other 'sins']. Can God be morally justified in sending someone to Hell because he/she did not believe the Christian god exists when the person was engaging the arguments and reasons given by theists and, to add 'icing on the cake,' permit believers to enter Heaven simply because they believed (and didn't even believe for the right reasons)?

Sketching what they call an “intellectually virtuous person” and the “epistemically virtuous person,” Philosophers Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood note, in their book Intellectual Virtues, “The epistemically virtuous person values, cherishes, seeks, and appreciates intellectual goods. She wants to know important truths and understand how things work … she wants to “see for herself” in some kind of striking, relatively unmediated way; she is not satisfied with operating on mere hearsay … She needs approaches to questions that will yield answers; she needs epistemic habits and skilled faculties that will accomplish the work of justified believing, seeing, and understanding. … She needs education and training and formation to these ends. And she needs practices that are well-designed for harvesting the epistemic goods.”

Roberts and Wood also note that people suffer from prejudice if they hold beliefs for inadequate reasons such as simply liking a belief, not wanting to experience negative consequences because of fear or anxiety, appeal to tradition, and lack of willingness to investigate whether or not the belief is justified.

Some persons, including myself, spend quite some time investigating questions relating to whether there is any justification for believing in anything supernatural. I would, as you might expect, say that my lack of belief in any gods is very justified (and, of course, I've argued this in various posts including a recent written debate) while belief in any gods is very unjustified. Shall I be punished by a god who never produced adequate evidence for his existence while, at the same time, my investigation into the 'god question' produced no good reason to believe in such a god? This would be ridiculous.

Likewise, it would be ridiculous for theists to be rewarded for belief in God although their reasons for belief were inadequate to establish belief, their belief was not the process of an intellectually virtuous process, and much more.

If God happened to exist, the state of the evidence before he either revealed himself or a particular person (or all/most persons) rightly led the atheist to maintain that there was no justification for belief in God. The theist was merely lucky for maintaining belief in God and they would not rightly be labeled as intellectually praiseworthy if God happened to exist because their reasons for believing so were unjustified.

I recognize that some theists honestly believe that belief in God is justified and, like me, some have spent considerable time in investigating these issues by writing, asking questions, reading, listening to debates, etc. I don't doubt the sincerity of persons, for instance, like Alvin Plantinga or William Lane Craig even though I think their arguments are very bad ones. If Craig and Plantinga happened to be right about the Christian god and their arguments did not warrant the conclusion that the Christian god existed, they are not justified in asserting that their belief was justified or maintaining that the atheist was unjustified.

Whether any gods exist or not, I maintain that my lack of belief in the Christian god is justified given the current state of the evidence. If theists happen to be right, and not for the current reasons they propose, their belief was not justified, but rather they happened to be lucky. If I happen to be wrong, my lack of belief in God, prior to the 'revelation' was justified.

As Bertrand Russell once said, responding to a question of, “What if God existed? What would you tell him?” I would say, likewise, to God, “Not enough evidence.” Theists can't rightly claim the high ground if God does happen to exist, for their belief was unjustified.

More on Divine Hiddenness

In a recent post, I discussed the problem of divine hiddenness (why God remains hidden despite very good reasons God would have to reveal himself). I showed why various standard arguments apologists give-- mainly 'free will defenses'-- to provide reasons for why God would remain hidden fail. I'll give a quick summary of my previous post and then argue that even if people believed God existed, not all would worship him.

I argued, in my first post on this topic, that there are no good reasons to suggest that persons would lose free will (assuming free will exists) because persons would be skeptical/ not everyone would believe that God exists. Additionally, I noted that the theist is trying to 'have it both ways' because some already maintain that there is an overwhelming amount of evidence for God...and yet they still maintain that they have free will. If a theist maintains that faith is the only way to believe in God and that there can not be sufficient evidence to believe, their argument about God's appearance compelling belief is undone by their own admission. Arguments concerning natural regularities and morally significant decisions also fail. Objections of 'we can't know the mind of God' and 'it is not God's responsibility to reveal himself' also fall short.

One point that I didn't discuss in depth was the idea that even if God revealed himself and everyone believed God existed, persons simply all would not worship him. Many atheists, in discussion about God's character, will argue that Christians are simply 'getting it wrong' when they apply the characteristic of 'all-loving' to God and would say that if the Christian god revealed himself, they would not worship him, but rather would rebel in some sort of way. Some persons of other religions, I would wager, even if the Christian god revealed himself and the Christian god had a very long conversation with us, would continue to worship their deities and offer some explanation of why their deities remained hidden while the Christian god revealed himself.

Some atheists -- and perhaps most popularly, Christopher Hitchens -- have argued that they do not want the Christian god to exist and would not 'sign on' to Heaven/eternal worship of God if a choice were to be had. Does the theist honestly think that persons like this would experience a cognitive shift if God revealed himself as he was known prior to revelation?

For some who may still not be convinced that all persons would not worship God if he utterly revealed himself, consider the following analogy. A large portion of the inhabitants of the planet Eth believe in an all-evil, all-powerful, and all-knowing god. Some persons who don't believe all-evil god exists object on various grounds such as atheists of planet earth do and say that even if all-evil god revealed himself, they would not worship such a being.

Is this situation much different than that on earth? If all-evil god revealed himself, some Ethians would refuse to worship. If all-good god revealed himself, Earthlings would refuse to worship. If you believe that Ethians could refuse to worship all-evil god, why wouldn't it be the case that Earthlings could do the same?

There is many good reasons to believe that God utterly revealing himself would not compel all persons to worship him.

---

A recent blog post from JD Curtis -- the person who I recently engaged with in a written debate -- responding to some of my arguments and a commenter on my Facebook page raises some questions and objections regarding the problem of divine hiddenness.

JD argues that arguments from "fine-tuning" and "the probability of specifically-coded DNA sequences arising by random chance" show "fingerprints of a Creator God [...] all over His creation" and says "God unmistakingly and clearly showing Himself to all would then diminish the overall amount of free choice we have when deciding what we would like to do." If JD believes that God revealing himself to all would diminish free choice and maintains that God had revealed himself to JD, it must follow that JD has diminished free choice...but JD doesn't maintain that he has diminished free choice. He simply can't have it both ways.

This is important because variations of 'free will defenses' rest on the idea that God doesn't utterly reveal himself because if he did, persons would lose their free will or have "diminished free choice" (as JD says here) in some manner. The theist can't possibly maintain this free will defense when he individually maintains that 'fingerprints of God are all over creation.' If the free will defense were to work, the individual theist who maintains there is sufficient evidence to believe in God must also maintain that their free will has been diminished.

JD maintains that "such a powerful manifestation would amount to coercion on God's behalf and God would rather that we behave and make our choices absent of any sort of psychological pressure on people that such an appearance would entail." JD notes that people behave differently when they perceive they are being watched. I agree. The problem, though, is, once again, that individual theists do believe they are being watched by God and they don't maintain that this is coercion. Many theists believe that there is sufficient reason to believe in God, yet they still 'sin' and face threats of hellfire. Why aren't individual theists being coerced today?

JD, responding to the change of 'don't threats of hellfire amount to coercion,' notes, "I find it only fair that we are forewarned of the consequences of our actions." This doesn't answer the objection. He also notes, "a truly evil god would never reveal that there were consequences for certain actions until we stand in judgment." I don't know what reason JD has for assuming this, but it's quite obvious that JD is largely ignoring fantasy literature. First, JD has no examples of truly evil gods that exist, so how can be make this claim. Second, would it be hard to imagine that a truly evil god would threaten people with consequences if they did not do its bidding?

Suppose, for example, a truly evil god wanted a specific trinket that a human owned. Suppose, then, that minions of this evil being approached this human and informed the human that he would be eternally imprisoned if he/she did not relinquish the trinket. Regardless, I don't see how knowing consequences somehow justifies a punishment [from a god that was unjust] or gets gods 'off the hook.'

JD seemingly goes on to say that there would be a major difference from God appearing and saying, "If you perform x, you'll go to Hell" and inspiring Bible writers to warn of a threat in the future while God did not tell this to a person. While it might be the case that persons may view God telling them more pressing, this still doesn't diminish the threat and individual theists still profess the dangers of Hell, are very afraid of it, etc. One of the ways theists [and the Bible] provide to diminish the threat or somehow deal with it is repentance; Jesus died so that sins may be forgiven.

I don't see how this gets the theist off the hook. What, exactly, is the argument here? JD doesn't explicitly state one. Perhaps the argument is, "God doesn't utterly reveal himself because the threat of Hell [, said by God,] would modify behavior." I've already dealt with this argument. Some theists believe that there are sufficient reasons to believe Hell really does exist and that they will possibly go there. Did these persons lose their free will?

A commenter on my page noted that JD was special pleading; he said that persons are aware that other persons exist and are not compelled to worship or love them and still maintain free will assuming free will exists. Why should God be a different case, the commenter wonders. JD's response to this is "you are in relationships with people because you want to be." Wonderful. Why, then, do the rules change with God? It is logically possible to both believe God exists and not worship God just like it is logically possible to believe other persons exist and not worship/love them. JD's working against himself here.

Finally, JD asks, " so you would argue a huge, gigantic, and beautiful sky-god [...] would in no way cause "psychological pressure" to "do some act against his or her will." I already addressed this in my first post on this topic; persons would still evaluate the given reasons to believe (or not believe) in God and come to a conclusion. If JD believes the 40-foot tall Jesus would coerce and that this is sufficient reason to believe in God, how can he also maintain what he considers to be evidence for God (fine-tuning and DNA) is not coercing him?

Divine Hiddenness and Free Will

Atheists (and theists) wonder why -- since it is the case that theists profess God wants everyone to believe he exists – God simply doesn't unequivocally reveal himself so that persons can 'enter into a relationship' with God, no longer doubt, stop fighting one another because of religious differences, and go to Heaven. An all-powerful, all-loving, and all-knowing god should have no problem revealing himself to persons and should want to do so considering he is all-loving [he wants persons to avoid Hell and enter into Heaven]. Why, then, doesn't God just stop playing hide-and-seek and reveal himself?

'Free will defenses' are typically given to explain divine hiddenness. Some variations of free will defenses to explain divine hiddenness and other ideas worth considering are as follows:

• (1) Humans would not have free will if God unequivocally revealed himself.

• (2) If God provided too much evidence to attest to his existence, persons would not be able to enter into a union with God properly because persons would be compelled to believe.

• (3) Faith is important and is only possible if God doesn't unequivocally reveal himself.

• (4) If people unequivocally knew that God existed, they wouldn't make morally significant decisions; people must choose good over evil rather than being compelled to do so.

• (5) God can't intervene often because there would be no stable natural regularities. (Swinburne argue this although this is probably more relevant to natural and moral evil theodicies).

• (6) We can't know the mind of God. God has some reason to remain hidden, but we are simply not aware of it.

• (7) Why expect God to reveal himself? It is the responsibility of humans to find God, not God's responsibility to reveal himself to humans.

I will respond to these six defenses and note further problems that theists face in which they simply can't 'have it both ways.'

Defense (1): Humans would not have free will if God unequivocally revealed himself.

Defense (1) is probably the most common defense that is given to explain divine hiddenness. Theists maintain that free will is supremely important and that this must be maintained no matter what. This 'free will defense' is also commonly given to explain moral evil even when, for example, someone's free will is being 'violated' by the actions of others. For instance, if someone is being raped, God won't intervene, the theist says, because the free will of the rapist is important to maintain. All of this aside, let's consider this defense more thoroughly.

Is it really the case that persons would lose free will if God unequivocally revealed himself? I'm quite skeptical. Many persons today will profess that God does exist and really do believe. Some, for whatever reason, will attest that their belief in God is warranted, profess belief in Heaven and Hell, and believe that their sins could result in eternal torment. Despite all of this, theists who profess very strong beliefs continue to sin. While God hasn't unequivocally revealed himself to everyone, these people will believe that God has revealed himself through the 'design' of the universe, an answered prayer, or something else...and they still sin. Additionally, these people, theists will allege, still have free will. It seems that defense (1), then, fails.

Would people suddenly be physically or logically unable to perform certain actions if God revealed himself? What good reasons do we have for believing this? Theists may argue that some behavior [or all behavior] may change, but I am quite skeptical of this. I'm additionally quite skeptical of the idea that such behavioral changes would not be the result of free choice. (Let's assume, for sake of this argument, that theistic definitions of free will are tenable.)

Perhaps the theist, at this point, will argue “Even though these people profess belief, it's not a belief that is the result of an unequivocal revelation of God. If God unequivocally revealed himself, the world would be a much different place and persons would not freely believe in God.” While it would very likely be the case that many non-believers (and/or persons who are theists, but don't really seem to care about adhering to 'God's law') would believe that God existed if he unequivocally revealed himself, I doubt that the believers who are currently really, really, really confident that God exists would act much differently. 'Free' or 'not free,' it seems that the behavior of those who are really, really, really confident that God exists would remain the same. Are we to believe that these people are simply 'faking it' and don't really believe as they profess (or something else)?

I and many other atheists are aware that even if a, say, 400 foot Jesus were to march through the skies and mountains were to spin around in the sky, there would still be reasons to be skeptical. Perhaps some advanced alien technology that we are unaware of is causing us to imagine that the event is happening or the display itself is the result of such technology. If I were to see something that did not seem to adhere with what I currently know about the universe, I wouldn't immediately jump to the conclusion that God exists. I'd approach this matter very carefully and would not jump to conclusions. If I were to believe in God after the result of a careful process and investigation, would the theist [who believes in free will] honestly say that my belief was not a result of free choices?

Defense (2): If God provided too much evidence to attest to his existence, persons would not be able to enter into a union with God properly because persons would be compelled to believe.

Defense (2) is quite suspect primarily because believers believe there is currently enough evidence to believe in God (thus they believe). What, exactly, is 'too much evidence,' anyway... and how is that different than enough evidence? Believers will point to the currently available evidence as 'overwhelming' by noting that the universe seems designed by God (look at the trees, stupid!), the resurrection of Jesus happened and there is historical information to attest to this, God answers prayers, the universe is fine-tuned, other miracles occurred, etc. Are we to believe that this current 'evidence' compels people to believe when many people simply are not convinced by it?

This idea of entering into a proper union with God, in this light, is interesting. Apparently, since an overwhelming amount of evidence currently exists, according to theists, no one is able to properly enter into union with God.

Perhaps to be more charitable, let us assume that some theists admit that the current evidence for God is not overwhelming (or not even convincing enough to believe) and belief is had only by faith. This would be quite an awkward admission because the belief, then, would only be justified (somehow) because of faith. On the theist's own admission, there is no evidence sufficient to warrant belief. If this is the case, what sort of evidence that God can produce possibly warrant belief? Why would 'the game' suddenly change if God were to produce the evidence?

Perhaps the theist, answering this, might say, “I have granted that there is no current evidence to warrant belief in God, but there could be some evidence to warrant belief in God that God could produce. God revealing himself would be that evidence.” I still, though, don't think that such evidence would compel people to believe or somehow take away their ability to disbelieve.

Defense (3): Faith is important and is only possible if God doesn't unequivocally reveal himself.

Defense (3) assumes that faith is important and seems to assume that without faith, belief in God is worthless. Why is this the case? Is not belief the important thing regardless of faith? Are those who currently believe and do not profess faith (but rather profess that arguments alone are good enough reason to believe) somehow 'doing it wrong?' Will these people not enter into a proper union with God?

Defense (4): If people unequivocally knew that God existed, they wouldn't make morally significant decisions; people must choose good over evil rather than being compelled to do so.

Defense (4) fails for some reasons noted above and namely because persons currently profess that the evidence of God is overwhelming...and these people still are able to make 'morally significant decisions.' Are we to believe that those who currently believe in God based on what they consider to be overwhelming evidence are being compelled to make certain decisions? A common idea that theists propose is that people would refrain from sinning if there were overwhelming evidence for God, but this obviously is not the case because people who believe there is overwhelming evidence continue to sin. Additionally, such persons who unequivocally believe note that 'nothing will change their mind' and that God's existence is quite obvious; such persons believe God has already unequivocally revealed himself. Again, as I mentioned, I find great difficulty believing that the behavior of persons would not be the result of free choice [assuming free will exists] if God unequivocally revealed himself.

Defense (5): God can't intervene often because there would be no stable natural regularities. (Swinburne argue this although this is probably more relevant to natural and moral evil theodicies).

Defense (5) is very suspect and ignores the fact that God is all-powerful and all-knowing. Why should we assume that there would be no natural regularities if God intervened in human affairs? Suppose that God were to strike down Hitler in order to prevent World War II (and such an action would indeed stop World War II). Would we then believe that this would suddenly entail that there would be no natural regularities? I don't see any good reasons to believe so.

The idea of God's intervention removing natural regularities (or, perhaps, to be more charitable, causing us to believe that some natural regularities might not be constant) seems quite funny [and leading to special pleading] considering that theists believe God has intervened in human affairs including but not limited to God raising Jesus from the dead. Some theists also believe that God answers prayers that would interfere with the free will of other persons. If theists maintain that Jesus raising from the dead and God's answering of prayer doesn't take away free will or natural regularities, how can they possibly maintain that God's intervention in there here and now, the future, or even in the past (minus the miracles, of course) would take away free will or natural regularities? The theist, it seems, would be forced to argue -- if he/she were to maintain that God's intervention would not take away free will or natural regularities – that free will 'works differently' from time to time, God's intervention in times past somehow did not take away free will, the free will of people in times past was not cherished like it is for people today, or something else.

Defense (6): We can't know the mind of God. God has some reason to remain hidden, but we are simply not aware of it.

Defense (6) can always pop up in almost any discussion about God. This 'mystery card' claims that there is some unknown, undetectable reason that God might have for failing to reveal himself in this case. We can, though, think of many really good reasons God would have for revealing himself and see, when other defenses are presented, that such defenses do not give us reason to believe God has a good reason to remain hidden (and argue that lack of evidence, reason, and argument supporting God's existence gives us good reason to not believe). Why should this 'unknown, undetectable reason' be permitted for the Christian god and not others? For all we know, every possible god for whom we currently have no good reason to believe exists has their own reasons to remain hidden. Who are you to question the minds of every possible god? I go into more detail with the 'You can't know the mind of God' defense here.

Defense (7): Why expect God to reveal himself? It is the responsibility of humans to find God, not God's responsibility to reveal himself to humans.

This objection largely misses the point of the problem of divine hiddenness to being with: if God is all-loving, all-knowing, and all-powerful, why shouldn't he reveal himself to humans? If the theist contests that it is the responsibility of humans to find God, this doesn't address the problem, but only shifts the responsibility. Further, if humans are to find God, doesn't this mean that God should have devised a more effective way of aiding humans to this goal? The 'ball' is back in 'God's court.'

Framing this in terms of responsibility might also be unhelpful. The problem really isn't about responsibility, but rather is that God -- since he is all-loving and all-powerful -- has no good reason to remain hidden and has every reason to make himself known.

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When we don't find a good reason to believe a proposition, the proper response is to not accept the claim. If we can't think of a possible reason for God not revealing himself (and additionally find no reasons to believe God exists), we're quite justified in not believing that the Christian god exists. Even if we can devise a reason for God remaining hidden, this doesn't, of course, mean that God exists. With lack of a reason for God to remain hidden and a lack of a reason to believe God exists, the theist faces two major problems.

The common defenses theists give to answer the problem of divine hiddenness fail. Theists believe that persons would lose their free will if God unequivocally revealed himself, but this simply is not the case. The variations of this free will response to the problem of divine hiddenness are not sufficient for one to believe that God has a good reason to remain hidden. Additionally, the idea that natural regularities can only be had if God remained hidden fails. Finally, the common 'mystery card,' if this works for the Christian god, would have to work for every other possible god.

My second post in this 'series' is here.