Debate/Discussion with Pastor John Murray - NEPA Pridefest 2012
I recently had a debate/discussion with Christian fundamentalist Pastor John Murray from Tree of Life Christian Fellowship Church at NEPA Pridefest 2012 (an LGBT festival) in Kingston, PA. Murray and fellow churchgoers arrived to preach to/protest at NEPA Pridefest 2012.
We chatted for about 45 minutes about homosexuality, faith, theological fatalism, free will, the problem of evil, Stephen Law's 'Evil God Challenge,' the Bible, the resurrection of Jesus, miracles, cosmological arguments, the soul, sin, and much more.
Philosopher Stephen Law enjoyed the discussion and you might too.
Enjoy this lively discussion.
NEPA Freethought Society Podcast Episode 12 - Practical Strategies to Combat Faith - with Dr. Peter Boghossian
Episode 12 of the NEPA Freethought Society Podcast is now available! Below is information copied directly from the podcast's page:
Have diversity initiatives sabotaged higher education?
Diversity initiatives in higher education, with the intent to foster harmony and understanding of others, seemed to have undermined some of the primary goals of higher education: leading students to critically self-reflect and hold justified true beliefs. Some diversity initiatives have reinforced the very harmful idea that disagreement is disrespectful and have also assented to indefensible epistemiological ideas including 'all perspectives are equally valid' and 'people are justified in holding a belief because it is a product of their culture.' Harmony can be had -- and perhaps better so -- as a result of critical discussion that should be encouraged and welcomed instead of discouraged and viewed as disrespectful.
(This post follows a recent discussion I had with philosopher Peter Boghossian. We have very similar views on this matter! I was aiming to write a post like this for some time, but haven't formulated my ideas in writing...so now is my chance.)
Readers who are familiar with my work should know that I value truth and critical discussion about beliefs. In many blog posts, podcasts, and speeches of mine, I argue for a reframing of the commonly assented to idea that disagreement is disrespectful...and the we just shouldn't disagree with people. Instead of viewing disagreement as something that must be disrespectful and viewing disagreement as something that should be avoided we should view disagreement as an opportunity to learn something, challenge our own beliefs, and perhaps lead others to reconsider their beliefs. We all have blind spots, after all, and could learn something by speaking with people whom we disagree with.
Diversity initiatives, though, from my experience, seem to buy into the 'disagreement is disrespect' meme and have led many to commit intellectual suicide concerning the nature of truth while sabatoging one of the chief goals of higher education - namely that students, when exposed to different ideas, should modify their beliefs and hold only that which is justified and true...all in the sake of some sort of harmony not worth wanting by any in the intellectual realm because many, it seems, don't believe that we can disagree about major issues and maintain harmony.
In my final year of high school -- and even in many of my introductory college courses such as 'first year experience' -- I was told time and time again that college was a time in which students would be exposed to people from all around the world with different worldviews, religious beliefs (or lack thereof), sexual orientations, political ideas, and so much more. Instead of being a member of a 'small town insular community,' college students are exposed to an entire different climate. While in college, the hope, I was told, was for students to consider others' beliefs and self-reflect so as to learn something and better understand the world, other cultures, and so much more. Self-reflection, it seems, should be a byproduct of exposure to new ideas.
All of this, though, while it seemed great at the time, seemed to be only partially true. I was exposed to different ideas and persons, but the self-reflection aspect simply wasn't something that was being promoted. Instead of critical discussion of ideas and self-examinations, faculty and students alike seemed to be brainwashed into accepting indefensible positions such as 'all perspectives are equally valid,' 'everyone is justified in believing what they believe because that is their right,' and 'we should, instead of challenging others, celebrate differences.'
All perspectives, though, as my philosophy classes have taught me, can't be equally valid because we would be lead to accept contradictions and be forced to accept ideas which fly in the face of our moral intuitions and logical reasoning. In my "Ethics and the Good Life" class which probably was one of the most influential classes in my second year of my undergraduate career, I learned that ethical cultural relativism -- the idea that a position is morally justified because a culture assents to it -- is one of the most indefensible ideas in ethics because, for example, cultures can assent to the idea that wife burning is morally acceptable.
"Who are we to argue with that" some will say, "because you aren't from that culture and people decide what's true for them." Unfortunately, this sentiment is all too common - and seemingly embraced by persons in the modern 'diversity movement.' Apparently, because I am not from a certain culture, some will contend, I am not qualified to share my ideas -- and just should not -- and truth just flies right out the window. In the name of not 'criticizing' ideas that are foreign to Americans, we're apparently supposed to tolerate intolerance and just 'leave ideas alone.' What a catastrophe.
My philosophy classes have also taught me that, when evaluating the merit of a belief, it's important to realize that not all opinions or beliefs are equal in weight; many opinions are uninformed, flawed, ill-formed, do not cohere with reality, and are outright fallacious. The simple fact that someone holds a belief does not lead to the belief being warranted. Persons ought to consider objections to their beliefs, whether a belief coheres with reality, whether the assumptions that lead to the belief are warranted, and so much more. While persons may have a legal right to hold a belief (and certainly won't be arrested for thinking about something), a moral right and whether the belief is a justified true belief or not is an entirely different matter. In the name of harmony, perhaps, and 'respect for beliefs,' diversity initiatives and other considerations have undermined higher education and have convinced so many that people are moral monsters to challenge others' beliefs.
Perhaps, as I mentioned, a major motivation people have to object to disagreement is to preserve harmony (as if the only way to do so is for people to sit down and shut up). Can't we just all live together and keep our beliefs to ourselves? Why can't we just live and let live? Why do people like me continue to write and do what I do? Aren't beliefs just private matters? People ask these questions quite frequently. It's quite difficult, I would respond to contend that many or most of our beliefs are solely private matters when it's quite clear that our beliefs inform our actions and have the ability to harm others and ourselves. Persons like me are concerned with what others believe because their beliefs impact others' quality of life. I care about whether or not people hold justified true beliefs when certain matters are of paramount concern.
Refraining from disagreement with others and assenting to the idea that all perspectives are equally valid seems to be quite an easy and attractive way to deal with disagreement, but it's an incredibly intellectually dishonest position and something that higher education should never maintain. What progress is had when people lack self-reflection? If all perspectives are equally valid, what is the point of challenging our own beliefs? Why should we even attend school and be concerned about holding justified true beliefs if this is the case?
Open-mindedness is a term that often gets thrown around by persons in diversity initiatives, but this term is largely misconstrued and quite relevant to this discussion. I am told, after I voice objections to people who hold untenable beliefs (often after they start a discussion with me and reveal that they haven't critically examined their own ideas and/or understand very little about epistemology and admit that they aren't concerned with truth), that I am closed-minded and that I should "accept others." Excuse me? Since when is asking questions about someone's belief a horrible thing [in the realm of higher education]? Do not teachers do this in almost every class and encourage students to self-reflect? True open-mindedness is a willingness to admit that you can be wrong about something and a willingness to change any and all ideas provided new evidence, reason, and argument comes in...and this 'being wrong' isn't a bad thing; admitting one is mistaken about something is a sign of progress and intellectual courage - and this is really something to respect and admire.
One thing that leaders of diversity initiatives and I can agree on is that it it more important that we live together than we all agree. Diversity initiatives, though, seem to take a drastically different approach to this matter and work from many flawed ideas about epistemology and a harmony 'worth wanting.' It is quite possible to be respectful toward persons while having a conversation about important and often contentious matters. A primary problem, though, is that people view 'attacks on ideas' as 'attacks on persons' even when said 'attacking' is done in a very civil and calm manner with regard to the person who holds the belief. Perhaps diversity initiatives should change the focus and maintain that critical disagreement is something that we should strive for and work on becoming better at. If we can 'step back' from our beliefs and understand others' perspectives, it seems that society will be a better place and that a true harmony can be had in which people -- instead of viewing disagreement as disrespect -- can have the intellectual courage to understand others instead of demonizing them...and an 'everyone is right and no one should disagree' attitude isn't going to get us there. This is not the goal of higher education and should not be the goal of diversity initiatives.
Leaders of diversity initiatives, instead of maintaining that all perspectives people hold are equally valid and that we just shouldn't assert that people are mistaken (or otherwise engage in critical discussion), should start to focus on how to respectfully disagree and prioritize justified true beliefs. We can 'bring our differences to the table' and consider meetings between differing individuals to be great opportunities for challenging our own beliefs and the beliefs of others rather than missing this great opportunity and hopelessly and dishonestly maintaining that all perspectives are equally valid and disagreement is just disrespectful. Critical discussion should bring about more understanding than does sitting back at a table and refraining from asking questions. If this is not the case -- and diversity programs continue to convince others that all perspectives are equally valid and discourage critical discussion -- it seems that diversity programs have sabotaged the aim of higher education and they are harming us more than they are helping us.
For more thoughts of mine, both in writing and through podcasting, on this matter, please utilize the following links:
Blog posts:
"Disagreement, not disrespecting: Attacking beliefs, not persons"
"A response to those who claim offense"
"Belief Intolerance"
"On being wrong, intellectual honesty, and acquiring belief"
"Truth relativism and liberal religion"
"Think for yourself already: A discussion I had with Muslims"
(During an inter-faith/diversity event I attended while in undergraduate career, students objected to me asking a Muslim man -- after he had asked for any question from the audience -- whether he believed that it is justifiable for non-Muslims to burn in Hell for eternity soon after the Muslim man had practically preached about how non-Muslims would burn in Hell for eternity. Some students thought I was the disrespectful one and was in the wrong to ask that question...)
Podcasts:
"Respecting Beliefs"
"Discussion on religious faith"
As always, please feel free to share this content, offer your own ideas, and give me some feedback.
Peter Boghossian to appear on NEPA Freethought Society Podcast
I was dismissed as 'professional atheist,' 'insensitive,' 'self-absorbed' by local newsradio host
Tyler Winstead's funeral packed the Mt. Zion Baptist Church with celebration, heartache and the promise of church-led community action to make Wilkes-Barre a better, peaceful city. What will it take for the dream to succeed? Talk to "Corbett" at 3 about the future.
Rev. Brewster's words of change are vapid. According to news reports, his plan of action is to "employ the weapon of unconditional and radical love for humanity." Brewster also says that Tyler "is in the best hands he will ever be" seemingly asserting -- whether he realizes it or not -- that he is better off dead and allegedly in the hands of God than he is alive. Perhaps to even make matters worse, Brewster claims that God has forgiven the person who killed Tyler and that Tyler's family has also forgiven. I wonder...how can someone possibly forgive someone whom they do not even know the identity of?
The solutions to this problem will not be found by appealing to faith, some other alleged world, or a so-called 'holy man.' Instead of talking so much about an alleged God in his sermon, Brewster could have put forth real plans for responding to violence rather than "the weapon of unconditional and radical love."
Nothing fails like prayer.
It's an utter shame that Brewster is grandstanding in the name of his faith and offering false hope to those in Wilkes-Barre and NEPA who are looking for real change and not some empty words about God and "unconditional and radical love." I don't suppose to know or have the answers, but one thing is for sure - Brewster doesn't know or have the answers.
Did you ever think that your lack of sensitivity for the grief of others might be one reason that some people will never take you as seriously as you would like, Justin?
Ok, Justin. Your overrunning this exchange with your self-absorbed sense of self-importantc is simply not acceptable. This discussion is about a dead child, not your childish need for instant gratification. Get over yourself for at least a day. Grow up. Tyler does not have that chance.
The failure of the Christian response to the death of Tyler Winstead
Hope is a desert running dryDeep insideYou refuse to face the factsBut pray for lifeFind salvation in distressWe will waitFor the day you break out and reawake
The vapid Christian response to the death of Tyler Winstead
We believe in God and his master plan - whether we understand it or not.
- God -- an all-loving, all-powerful, and all-knowing being -- includes the shooting death of a 14-year-old boy in his 'master plan.'
- Since God is all-loving, all-powerful, and all-knowing, his 'master plan' should be lauded because only all-good consequences can flow from an all-loving being. (Many Christians, from my experience, have argued or asserted that all judgments or actions stemming from God must accord with his all-loving character)
- Since Tyler Winstead was killed as part of God's plan (and God is all-loving), this is actually -- as much as our moral intuitions may contend -- a good thing. [I'll get more into this later considering a pastor actually states that Tyler "is in the best hands he ever will be.]
I know the plans that I have for you, declares the Lord. They are plans for peace and not disaster.
It's unfortunate that the Citizen's Voice did not include the comments that followed pertaining to that passage: That is is not God's plan that any life should be taken by another and that God intends a hopeful future for all. We are not to allow perpetrators of violent acts to hold us hostage and attempt to deny us a life of peace and justice.
A large number of us have determined to engage with a fierce, and much more powerful weapon, the likes of which no evil has the power to withstand," Brewster said. "We'll employ the weapon of unconditional and radical love for humanity, and out right to live, and not only live, but our right to thrive in a community in peace, in this beautiful valley God has created, in this place we call our home. We intend to preserve it.
he is in the best hands he will ever be.
I want to say to those who are responsible for taking this precious life, I want you to know that despite what you've done, God has and always will love you. And he stands ready to forgive you, should you humble yourself and ask for his forgiveness. Furthermore, it is because of the message of Easter, which brings hope to all mankind, that the family, too, has chosen to love and to forgive you as well.
New video episodes of NEPA Freethought Society Podcast available!
'Respecting beliefs' (and right to opinion and taking offense)
'Religion and the workplace' discussion with Karla Porter
Are science and faith in opposition?
God and the Gettier Problem: If God existed, was theistic belief justified?
In a short essay titled Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, philosopher Edmund Gettier raised some concerns about, as you may have guessed, justified true belief and knowledge. For this post, I'd like to explore how Gettier's essay relates to belief in God. If God happened to exist, can Christians rightly claim the 'high ground' and say that their belief in God was justified while atheists' lack of belief was unjustified?
Reflecting on Gettier's essay, we realize that it's quite possible to have sufficient evidence to believe a proposition and be correct even though the evidence did not lead to the truth value of the proposition. Suppose, for example, that I show you a good deal of evidence for you to be justified in believing that I own a Jeep. You believe that you are justified in believing that I own a Jeep and base your belief on the given evidence...but it turns out that your belief was correct despite the evidence you were shown. The reality of the situation – unknown to both me and you – was that I bought the Jeep from a dealer who had forged documents and had stolen the Jeep and someone named Kevin really owned the Jeep, but unbeknownst to me and you, I won a raffle on the same day you believed I owned a Jeep. In short, your belief that I owned a Jeep was correct, but for 'all the wrong reasons.' You simply were 'lucky' and arrived at a justified true belief because of chance.
Likewise, it's totally possible to be very justified in lacking belief in a given proposition and happen to be wrong for some unknown and perhaps unlikely reason. Consider Peter Popoff. Popoff is a televangelist who was exposed as a fraud during the days of The Tonight Show with Johnny Carson by skeptic James Randi. Popoff claimed to be able to cure diseases persons had and also claimed to have a direct link with God that allowed him to know details of persons such as their home addresses and what ailments they had. Randi discovered that Popoff had advance information about audience members and received said information from his wife via an earpiece.
We're quite justified in believing that Popoff was a charlatan and didn't have a direct link with God because we have a naturalistic and very plausible alternative explanation. Suppose, though, that Popoff really did have a link with God and the earpiece was simply a backup just in case God decided not to relay information to Popoff. Despite our justification in lacking belief that Popoff spoke with God, we actually were wrong. Was our lack of belief in Popoff's claims of speaking with God unjustified? Can 'Popoff believers' be considered intellectually praiseworthy?
Many Christians believe that their belief in God is justified even though they appeal to different reasons, many of the arguments given are deeply problematic, faith doesn't constitute knowledge, and much more. Some rely on Pascal's Wager – the idea, roughly, that we 'should elect to believe' in the Christian god because there is no way to 'know' whether God exists or not, so we ought to believe rather than disbelieve and face punishment – to somehow substantiate their belief in God. Whatever the reason, Christians believe that God exists. All of the standard reasons, it seems, are not sufficient to establish belief in God; many of the given arguments and reasons to believe in the Christian god, it seems, have been thoroughly 'debunked.'
Suppose, though, that the Christian god actually did exist and not one person's reason to warrant belief was justified. Suppose the Christian god actually did have sufficient reasons to create a universe with laws that guarantee random killing of persons through diseases, natural disasters, and much more; the problem of evil turned out to no longer be a problem. Suppose that the Christian god had a sufficient reason to remain hidden despite some obvious reasons that he should have to reveal himself.
Suppose that one day, the Christian god decided to utterly reveal himself so that almost everyone believed. Suppose he materialized in human form, submitted himself to all of our tests, and made non-belief an unreasonable position on par with belief that aliens created Olyphant, PA [or insert your favorite wacky claim here]. Perhaps, if he did not manifest in human form and provide very good reasons for humans to believe he existed, he simply happened to exist in an afterlife of sorts. At this point, should the persons who believe in the Christian god be intellectually praiseworthy for their belief? Can Christians rightly poke fun at non-Christians and call them fools as the Bible does?
If the Christian god exists, Christians have no justification whatsoever to claim that they are intellectually praiseworthy because their previous ideas that they believed led to justification for belief in the Christian god were not sufficient to warrant belief. These Christians were simply lucky and the non-Christians were justified in not believing that the Christian god existed.
**
Enter the concept of Hell, perhaps one of the most immoral and absurd parts of the Christian belief system – at least as understood by most laypersons. Hell, for the purposes of this post, is where non-Christians go to be tortured for eternity after they die for not believing that the Christian god exists [and other 'sins']. Can God be morally justified in sending someone to Hell because he/she did not believe the Christian god exists when the person was engaging the arguments and reasons given by theists and, to add 'icing on the cake,' permit believers to enter Heaven simply because they believed (and didn't even believe for the right reasons)?
Sketching what they call an “intellectually virtuous person” and the “epistemically virtuous person,” Philosophers Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood note, in their book Intellectual Virtues, “The epistemically virtuous person values, cherishes, seeks, and appreciates intellectual goods. She wants to know important truths and understand how things work … she wants to “see for herself” in some kind of striking, relatively unmediated way; she is not satisfied with operating on mere hearsay … She needs approaches to questions that will yield answers; she needs epistemic habits and skilled faculties that will accomplish the work of justified believing, seeing, and understanding. … She needs education and training and formation to these ends. And she needs practices that are well-designed for harvesting the epistemic goods.”
Roberts and Wood also note that people suffer from prejudice if they hold beliefs for inadequate reasons such as simply liking a belief, not wanting to experience negative consequences because of fear or anxiety, appeal to tradition, and lack of willingness to investigate whether or not the belief is justified.
Some persons, including myself, spend quite some time investigating questions relating to whether there is any justification for believing in anything supernatural. I would, as you might expect, say that my lack of belief in any gods is very justified (and, of course, I've argued this in various posts including a recent written debate) while belief in any gods is very unjustified. Shall I be punished by a god who never produced adequate evidence for his existence while, at the same time, my investigation into the 'god question' produced no good reason to believe in such a god? This would be ridiculous.
Likewise, it would be ridiculous for theists to be rewarded for belief in God although their reasons for belief were inadequate to establish belief, their belief was not the process of an intellectually virtuous process, and much more.
If God happened to exist, the state of the evidence before he either revealed himself or a particular person (or all/most persons) rightly led the atheist to maintain that there was no justification for belief in God. The theist was merely lucky for maintaining belief in God and they would not rightly be labeled as intellectually praiseworthy if God happened to exist because their reasons for believing so were unjustified.
I recognize that some theists honestly believe that belief in God is justified and, like me, some have spent considerable time in investigating these issues by writing, asking questions, reading, listening to debates, etc. I don't doubt the sincerity of persons, for instance, like Alvin Plantinga or William Lane Craig even though I think their arguments are very bad ones. If Craig and Plantinga happened to be right about the Christian god and their arguments did not warrant the conclusion that the Christian god existed, they are not justified in asserting that their belief was justified or maintaining that the atheist was unjustified.
Whether any gods exist or not, I maintain that my lack of belief in the Christian god is justified given the current state of the evidence. If theists happen to be right, and not for the current reasons they propose, their belief was not justified, but rather they happened to be lucky. If I happen to be wrong, my lack of belief in God, prior to the 'revelation' was justified.
As Bertrand Russell once said, responding to a question of, “What if God existed? What would you tell him?” I would say, likewise, to God, “Not enough evidence.” Theists can't rightly claim the high ground if God does happen to exist, for their belief was unjustified.
More on Divine Hiddenness
Divine Hiddenness and Free Will
Atheists (and theists) wonder why -- since it is the case that theists profess God wants everyone to believe he exists – God simply doesn't unequivocally reveal himself so that persons can 'enter into a relationship' with God, no longer doubt, stop fighting one another because of religious differences, and go to Heaven. An all-powerful, all-loving, and all-knowing god should have no problem revealing himself to persons and should want to do so considering he is all-loving [he wants persons to avoid Hell and enter into Heaven]. Why, then, doesn't God just stop playing hide-and-seek and reveal himself?
'Free will defenses' are typically given to explain divine hiddenness. Some variations of free will defenses to explain divine hiddenness and other ideas worth considering are as follows:
- (1) Humans would not have free will if God unequivocally revealed himself.
(2) If God provided too much evidence to attest to his existence, persons would not be able to enter into a union with God properly because persons would be compelled to believe.
(3) Faith is important and is only possible if God doesn't unequivocally reveal himself.
(4) If people unequivocally knew that God existed, they wouldn't make morally significant decisions; people must choose good over evil rather than being compelled to do so.
(5) God can't intervene often because there would be no stable natural regularities. (Swinburne argue this although this is probably more relevant to natural and moral evil theodicies).
- (6) We can't know the mind of God. God has some reason to remain hidden, but we are simply not aware of it.
- (7) Why expect God to reveal himself? It is the responsibility of humans to find God, not God's responsibility to reveal himself to humans.
I will respond to these six defenses and note further problems that theists face in which they simply can't 'have it both ways.'
Defense (1): Humans would not have free will if God unequivocally revealed himself.
Defense (1) is probably the most common defense that is given to explain divine hiddenness. Theists maintain that free will is supremely important and that this must be maintained no matter what. This 'free will defense' is also commonly given to explain moral evil even when, for example, someone's free will is being 'violated' by the actions of others. For instance, if someone is being raped, God won't intervene, the theist says, because the free will of the rapist is important to maintain. All of this aside, let's consider this defense more thoroughly.
Is it really the case that persons would lose free will if God unequivocally revealed himself? I'm quite skeptical. Many persons today will profess that God does exist and really do believe. Some, for whatever reason, will attest that their belief in God is warranted, profess belief in Heaven and Hell, and believe that their sins could result in eternal torment. Despite all of this, theists who profess very strong beliefs continue to sin. While God hasn't unequivocally revealed himself to everyone, these people will believe that God has revealed himself through the 'design' of the universe, an answered prayer, or something else...and they still sin. Additionally, these people, theists will allege, still have free will. It seems that defense (1), then, fails.
Would people suddenly be physically or logically unable to perform certain actions if God revealed himself? What good reasons do we have for believing this? Theists may argue that some behavior [or all behavior] may change, but I am quite skeptical of this. I'm additionally quite skeptical of the idea that such behavioral changes would not be the result of free choice. (Let's assume, for sake of this argument, that theistic definitions of free will are tenable.)
Perhaps the theist, at this point, will argue “Even though these people profess belief, it's not a belief that is the result of an unequivocal revelation of God. If God unequivocally revealed himself, the world would be a much different place and persons would not freely believe in God.” While it would very likely be the case that many non-believers (and/or persons who are theists, but don't really seem to care about adhering to 'God's law') would believe that God existed if he unequivocally revealed himself, I doubt that the believers who are currently really, really, really confident that God exists would act much differently. 'Free' or 'not free,' it seems that the behavior of those who are really, really, really confident that God exists would remain the same. Are we to believe that these people are simply 'faking it' and don't really believe as they profess (or something else)?
I and many other atheists are aware that even if a, say, 400 foot Jesus were to march through the skies and mountains were to spin around in the sky, there would still be reasons to be skeptical. Perhaps some advanced alien technology that we are unaware of is causing us to imagine that the event is happening or the display itself is the result of such technology. If I were to see something that did not seem to adhere with what I currently know about the universe, I wouldn't immediately jump to the conclusion that God exists. I'd approach this matter very carefully and would not jump to conclusions. If I were to believe in God after the result of a careful process and investigation, would the theist [who believes in free will] honestly say that my belief was not a result of free choices?
Defense (2): If God provided too much evidence to attest to his existence, persons would not be able to enter into a union with God properly because persons would be compelled to believe.
Defense (2) is quite suspect primarily because believers believe there is currently enough evidence to believe in God (thus they believe). What, exactly, is 'too much evidence,' anyway... and how is that different than enough evidence? Believers will point to the currently available evidence as 'overwhelming' by noting that the universe seems designed by God (look at the trees, stupid!), the resurrection of Jesus happened and there is historical information to attest to this, God answers prayers, the universe is fine-tuned, other miracles occurred, etc. Are we to believe that this current 'evidence' compels people to believe when many people simply are not convinced by it?
This idea of entering into a proper union with God, in this light, is interesting. Apparently, since an overwhelming amount of evidence currently exists, according to theists, no one is able to properly enter into union with God.
Perhaps to be more charitable, let us assume that some theists admit that the current evidence for God is not overwhelming (or not even convincing enough to believe) and belief is had only by faith. This would be quite an awkward admission because the belief, then, would only be justified (somehow) because of faith. On the theist's own admission, there is no evidence sufficient to warrant belief. If this is the case, what sort of evidence that God can produce possibly warrant belief? Why would 'the game' suddenly change if God were to produce the evidence?
Perhaps the theist, answering this, might say, “I have granted that there is no current evidence to warrant belief in God, but there could be some evidence to warrant belief in God that God could produce. God revealing himself would be that evidence.” I still, though, don't think that such evidence would compel people to believe or somehow take away their ability to disbelieve.
Defense (3): Faith is important and is only possible if God doesn't unequivocally reveal himself.
Defense (3) assumes that faith is important and seems to assume that without faith, belief in God is worthless. Why is this the case? Is not belief the important thing regardless of faith? Are those who currently believe and do not profess faith (but rather profess that arguments alone are good enough reason to believe) somehow 'doing it wrong?' Will these people not enter into a proper union with God?
Defense (4): If people unequivocally knew that God existed, they wouldn't make morally significant decisions; people must choose good over evil rather than being compelled to do so.
Defense (4) fails for some reasons noted above and namely because persons currently profess that the evidence of God is overwhelming...and these people still are able to make 'morally significant decisions.' Are we to believe that those who currently believe in God based on what they consider to be overwhelming evidence are being compelled to make certain decisions? A common idea that theists propose is that people would refrain from sinning if there were overwhelming evidence for God, but this obviously is not the case because people who believe there is overwhelming evidence continue to sin. Additionally, such persons who unequivocally believe note that 'nothing will change their mind' and that God's existence is quite obvious; such persons believe God has already unequivocally revealed himself. Again, as I mentioned, I find great difficulty believing that the behavior of persons would not be the result of free choice [assuming free will exists] if God unequivocally revealed himself.
Defense (5): God can't intervene often because there would be no stable natural regularities. (Swinburne argue this although this is probably more relevant to natural and moral evil theodicies).
Defense (5) is very suspect and ignores the fact that God is all-powerful and all-knowing. Why should we assume that there would be no natural regularities if God intervened in human affairs? Suppose that God were to strike down Hitler in order to prevent World War II (and such an action would indeed stop World War II). Would we then believe that this would suddenly entail that there would be no natural regularities? I don't see any good reasons to believe so.
The idea of God's intervention removing natural regularities (or, perhaps, to be more charitable, causing us to believe that some natural regularities might not be constant) seems quite funny [and leading to special pleading] considering that theists believe God has intervened in human affairs including but not limited to God raising Jesus from the dead. Some theists also believe that God answers prayers that would interfere with the free will of other persons. If theists maintain that Jesus raising from the dead and God's answering of prayer doesn't take away free will or natural regularities, how can they possibly maintain that God's intervention in there here and now, the future, or even in the past (minus the miracles, of course) would take away free will or natural regularities? The theist, it seems, would be forced to argue -- if he/she were to maintain that God's intervention would not take away free will or natural regularities – that free will 'works differently' from time to time, God's intervention in times past somehow did not take away free will, the free will of people in times past was not cherished like it is for people today, or something else.
Defense (6): We can't know the mind of God. God has some reason to remain hidden, but we are simply not aware of it.
Defense (6) can always pop up in almost any discussion about God. This 'mystery card' claims that there is some unknown, undetectable reason that God might have for failing to reveal himself in this case. We can, though, think of many really good reasons God would have for revealing himself and see, when other defenses are presented, that such defenses do not give us reason to believe God has a good reason to remain hidden (and argue that lack of evidence, reason, and argument supporting God's existence gives us good reason to not believe). Why should this 'unknown, undetectable reason' be permitted for the Christian god and not others? For all we know, every possible god for whom we currently have no good reason to believe exists has their own reasons to remain hidden. Who are you to question the minds of every possible god? I go into more detail with the 'You can't know the mind of God' defense here.
Defense (7): Why expect God to reveal himself? It is the responsibility of humans to find God, not God's responsibility to reveal himself to humans.
This objection largely misses the point of the problem of divine hiddenness to being with: if God is all-loving, all-knowing, and all-powerful, why shouldn't he reveal himself to humans? If the theist contests that it is the responsibility of humans to find God, this doesn't address the problem, but only shifts the responsibility. Further, if humans are to find God, doesn't this mean that God should have devised a more effective way of aiding humans to this goal? The 'ball' is back in 'God's court.'
Framing this in terms of responsibility might also be unhelpful. The problem really isn't about responsibility, but rather is that God -- since he is all-loving and all-powerful -- has no good reason to remain hidden and has every reason to make himself known.
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When we don't find a good reason to believe a proposition, the proper response is to not accept the claim. If we can't think of a possible reason for God not revealing himself (and additionally find no reasons to believe God exists), we're quite justified in not believing that the Christian god exists. Even if we can devise a reason for God remaining hidden, this doesn't, of course, mean that God exists. With lack of a reason for God to remain hidden and a lack of a reason to believe God exists, the theist faces two major problems.
The common defenses theists give to answer the problem of divine hiddenness fail. Theists believe that persons would lose their free will if God unequivocally revealed himself, but this simply is not the case. The variations of this free will response to the problem of divine hiddenness are not sufficient for one to believe that God has a good reason to remain hidden. Additionally, the idea that natural regularities can only be had if God remained hidden fails. Finally, the common 'mystery card,' if this works for the Christian god, would have to work for every other possible god.
My second post in this 'series' is here.